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Submarine acquisitions are on the rise throughout Asia. This thesis examines the 
national motivations behind this trend in three cases: India, China and Japan. Four 
hypotheses - focusing on national security, factional interests, technological 
momentum and institutional theoiy - are utilized in order to gain insight into the 
decision making process surrounding submarine acquisitions. The development of a 
conventional submarine fleet is strongly influenced by national security issues. The 
remaining three factors are also present in each case of submarine acquisitions, but 
to a much lesser degree. Indian and Chinese nuclear submarine developments are 
difficult to justify based solely on security threats due to the submarine's lack of 
strategic integration and the availability of low cost conventional submarines to cover 
professed strategic interests. In each case, factional interests influenced the control 
of the nuclear programs, while at the decision-makig level, nuclear submarines are 
perceived as an avenue to higher international standing or as a means to fulfilling the 
international role to which the country aspires. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With naval expansion well underway throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the 
submarine is rapidly becoming a platform of choice. Of the nine Asian navies operating 
submarines today, eight are modernizing their fleets. These countries are India, China, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, and Pakistan. This group will soon be 
joined by Singapore and Malaysia. As a part of the modernization trend, air independent 
propulsion will be tested in the Pacific adding to the current submarine capabilities. The 
acceleration in submarine acquisitions might be a temporary surge, or it might continue 
into the next century, but nevertheless, this region will be concerned with undersea 
warfare for many years to come. The motivations driving the current trend need to be 
understood in order to plan for an ever more complex undersea environment. 
This thesis examines the influences driving submarine acquisitions through case 
studies of the three major Asian navies: India, China and Japan. Four hypotheses are used 
to gain insight into the decision-making process in each country: 
• National Security - Threat Based: The development of a submarine fleet is 
shaped by the security threats to its nation, as perceived by the state level 
decision makers as unitary, rational actors. 
• Factional Interests: The development of the submarine fleet is shaped by 
factional interests within the state. The factional interest of concern will differ 
between nuclear and conventional submarines and will be a larger driving factor 
for the nuclear propulsion program. 
0 Technological Momentum: Technological momentum shapes the development of 
submarine construction. For a conventional program, this will be based on 
shipyard capacity, and for a nuclear program, it will be driven by the scientific 
community. 
Institutional Theory: The shaping of a nation's submarine fleet is based on the 
connection of the nation-state to the global cultural system defining national 
identities as well as appropriate or inappropriate behavior for a nation-state 
through the recognition of "status" and "norms. " 
IX 
In each of the cases, this study examines the development of the submarine fleet from its 
inception to the present. Each hypothesis is evaluated in terms of its ability to explain the 
pace and scope of submarine investments in each country. The national security hypothesis 
examines the perception of threat and how a submarine fleet responds to that threat. 
Factional and technological arguments evaluate the decision making process looking at 
cost and benefits and how they relate to that country's national interests. Institutional 
theory is a less tangible explanation, but shows itself in the rhetoric surrounding submarine 
development. This comes out through statements indicating a symbolic or normative 
nature associated with the role or identity a nation feels that it holds in the international 
social structure. 
The conclusions drawn in this study are split around nuclear and conventional 
platform types. In each country case study, the national security issues strongly influences 
the development of a conventional submarine fleet. India feels directly threatened by 
Pakistan and China. China utilized submarines as a layer of defense and as a means of 
creating a threat. Japan faced the largest submarine fleet in the Pacific in the form of the 
Soviet fleet. By itself, a threat based explanation is compelling, but it does not bring out 
other influences which impact fleet developments. The remaining three hypotheses are 
present in each case in a limited fashion. Indian ship building lobbied in support of 
acquisitions leading to indigenous construction. Chinese political factions constrained the 
Romeo building program, but with bureaucratic and technological momentum in place, 
these submarines continued to roll off the production lines. Japan's submarine fleet had to 
shaped to fit not only the threat but the constitutional constraints of article nine in order to 
meet defensive needs only. Through three decades, Japanese submarines have been 
upgraded through the return of civilian advances resulting from economic success. 
The motivations driving nuclear submarine development differ from those 
influencing conventional submarine investments. The high cost of nuclear development 
could not be justified in the face of a limited strategic outlook and a low cost conventional 
alternative. Neither case could use technological momentum in the initial phases as they 
each started from scratch and received no foreign assistance. For India, the nuclear 
establishment, led by the Bhaba Atomic Research Center, had significant influence over 
the beginnings of nuclear propulsion development. Chinese political factions were more 
concerned with program control than with program advancement causing delays. The 
linking factor between these cases is the value which each nation places upon nuclear 
submarine development. Mao Zedong went as far as to say that China "will have to build 
nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years!" For each nation, the addition of 
nuclear submarines is perceived as an avenue to higher international standing or as a 
means to fulfilling the international role to which the country aspires. 
Understanding the motivations for submarine acquisitions and recognizing the 
trend of submarine proliferation are equally important. Even if the trend does not continue 
into the twenty-first century, the commitment to submarine operations is embedded in 
many Asian navies; thus undersea warfare will continue to be a concern throughout the 
Pacific Rim and Indian Ocean. Asia's submarines will again need to be modernized and 
replaced within another two decades, thus repeating this process all over again. 
Understanding the motivations will help us to understand how history might repeat itself. 
XI 
Xll 
I.       INTRODUCTION 
To complete the three dimensional picture let us look at the deadliest of the 
class - the submarine. They are vessels of stealth, and visibility or presence 
is not their hallmark. They play a very crucial role in denying the use of the 
sea to the enemy. 
- Vice Admiral S. P. Govil, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) 1994 
Undersea warfare has taken a significant shift in emphasis away from the old open 
ocean, deep water threat of the Soviet submarine fleet. The Pacific basin and Indian Ocean 
were ruled by the superpowers in terms of submarine warfare. As this contention fades, 
the void that has been created is being filled by other Asian navies. Although none of these 
fleets directly threaten the United States or its navy, U.S. interests can be found in every 
corner of this region. 
The cold war is over, but submarine warfare is not dead. In the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans, nine navies are operating submarines and two more have approved acquisitions. 
Each of these fleets is currently modernizing its submarines through indigenous 
construction or foreign purchases. With Air Independent Propulsion on the horizon, 
conventional submarine modernization may soon close a portion of the gap with nuclear 
platforms. The most probable future battleground for submarines will be within littoral 
waters.1 The Sea of Japan, South China Sea and Arabian Sea are three of the primary 
littoral regions of concern as delineated by the Office of Naval Intelligence.2 This chapter 
expands upon how these regions have been affected by submarines in the past and 
establishes the major players operating submarines today. 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, "littoral" is considered to include the shallow or constricted maritime 
regions characterized by poor acoustic conditions including high ambient noise and high 
reverberation. 
2
 Office of Naval Intelligence, "The Submarine Threat in the Coming Decade" (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994): 10. 
This thesis examines the submarine fleets of Asia and the processes through which 
they have developed. By exploring the decision making process in three main case studies, 
I determine whether the motivations for submarine development are consistent across 
various states and at what level these decisions are being made. 
A.        THEORY 
To evaluate the driving motives behind the growth of a submarine fleet, four 
general hypotheses will be used, including some derived from the major theories of 
international relations. By viewing submarine development from these perspectives, 
additional insights can be gained about the actor's motivations. These hypotheses provide 
for different viewpoints in order to help with understanding overall submarine 
development. The first two hypotheses are drawn from the most common explanations for 
military build-ups, dealing with national security issues and internal factional interests. 
These possible explanations are all guided by the central principle of an unitary, rational 
actor. This assumes that, at some point, there must be a calculation, based upon the 
available information, of cost and benefit and a weighing of these to select the alternative 
which maximizes the outcome. The remaining hypotheses work on a systemic level 
reducing the decision maker's options. Different levels of decision making are separated in 
the hypotheses because they each create a unique prediction. 
In working with single case studies, theories cannot be tested strictly due to the 
lack of a control case. For this work, the hypotheses are designed to provide different 
views or insights to understanding submarine acquisitions. The key to the method is that 
no single theory can stand alone throughout time. In each case study, the various 
influences interact and change as the submarine fleet develops. 
1.        Hypotheses3 
a.        National Security - Threat Based 
The development of a submarine fleet is shaped by the security threats to 
its nation, as perceived by the state level decision makers as unitary, rational actors. 
National security issues are the easiest route to justifying an action. The creation and 
dissemination of a perceived security threat can provide the reasons behind taking a 
certain path. For the case of submarine procurement and development, the key issue is the 
development of a maritime threat or more importantly the perception of an undersea 
threat. This threat may be perceived to come from a neighboring state, regional actor or 
from a superpower. In evaluating this hypothesis, the response to the threat is the key in 
how well it is tailored to the nation's security needs. The primary mission for most large 
submarine fleets, including the U.S. submarines, has been anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
with other uses such as anti-surface warfare (ASUW) or mining coming secondary. This 
may not be the case for smaller fleets. ASW needs cannot provide sufficient drive for the 
current trend in submarine developments worldwide. The multi-mission capability 
centering around the stealth of a submarine must be considered in evaluating a states 
reaction to a perceived threat and its motivation for submarine acquisition. 
For the purpose of this case study, the maritime threat to a nation will be 
considered to include any country that is capable of moving naval forces into that nation's 
regional waters, and is perceived to have an intent to influence regional affairs. This threat 
is determined by monitoring the "international political-economic environment in an 
attempt to evaluate the scope and extent of potential threats that are posed by potential 
opponents."4 Therefore, a nation's submarine fleet will be shaped by their perception of 
3
 One additional hypotheses centered on superpower influence was evaluated and discarded. The idea 
that the United States or Soviet Union provided motivational impetus behind submarine 
development did not prove to be significant for any of the case studies. The superpowers were 
influential in terms of perceived threat or as an arms supplier, but not in terms of directing another 
navy's submarine build-up. 
the threat, or potential threat, created by outside naval influence in the region and the 
ability of the submarine to deter or counter that threat. 
b. Factional Interests 
The development of the submarine fleet is shaped by factional interests 
within the state. The factional interest of concern will differ between nuclear and 
conventional submarines and will be a larger driving factor for the nuclear propidsion 
program. The factional interest hypothesis is based around the idea that there exists, 
within the state, an internal group which holds significant enough influence to be able to 
push through programs which are of benefit to its own interests but not necessarily in line 
with the overall national interest. For submarine procurement and development, the 
possible factions which may exert this kind of influence would include the military 
hierarchy, the shipbuilding industry or the nuclear establishment.3 To evaluate this 
hypothesis, it will be necessary to determine the benefits of the submarine program as 
compared to other alternatives. 
c. Technological Momentum 
Technological momentum shapes the development of submarine 
construction. For a conventional program, this will be based on shipyard capacity, and 
for a nuclear program, it will be driven by the scientific community. The technological 
momentum argument has very close ties to the organizational or bureaucratic arguments. 
This hypothesis has very different expectations when split around the conventional or 
nuclear programs. For a diesel submarine program, the shipyard capacity and training may 
be expanded to accommodate the indigenous construction of submarines. Technical 
momentum would be a matter of being forced to maintain the capacity and the knowledge 
levels to continue the construction process. Construction contracts have a large impact on 
4
 Michael Don Ward and A. K. Mahajan, "Defense Expenditures, Security Threats, and Government 
Deficits," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 3 (September 1984): 386. 
5
 The shipbuilding industry would include all private or government groups supported through naval 
contracts. The nuclear establishment would include primarily the scientific community conducting 
research and development. 
the local economy creating a need to maintain a consistent construction rate. Proof of this 
momentum would be tied to the lobby by the shipyard to maintain funds for construction. 
For a nuclear program, the technological momentum argument becomes much more 
compelling. The issue to be resolved is whether the nuclear propulsion program is the 
natural extension of nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs or is it a side program 
driven by a different issue. 
d.        Institutional Theory 
The shaping of a nation's submarine fleet is based on the connection of 
the nation-state to the global cultural system defining national identities as well as 
appropriate or inappropriate behavior for a nation-state through the recognition of 
"status" and "norms. " The final hypothesis centers around what Eyre and Suchman have 
described as "an alternative perspective" to the spread of high technology weaponry, 
institutional theory.6 This argument emphasizes that programs such as submarine 
development may be driven by more than simply national security or rational choice 
calculations. They reduce the argument to say that weapons systems are pursued "not 
because of their match between technical capabilities and national security needs, but 
because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry." It is 
through a connection to the global system that a nation-state becomes infused with the 
standards and norms which it perceives as the appropriate behavior for an actor hold a 
certain identity in the global culture. 
In addition to system influence, the drive for modernity creates "norms." 
To be considered a modern nation requires the existence of a modern navy. One avenue to 
a modern navy, without the expenditures for capital ships or weapons research and 
development, may be to purchase submarines. The next step to modernity could then be an 
6
 Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional 
Weapons: An Institutional Approach" in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Culture and National Security 
(Columbia University Press, forthcoming). 
7
 Ibid., 9. 
indigenous production program. Forty-four navies worldwide have added submarines to 
their order of battle making this a standard by which all navies may be judged. The nuclear 
powered submarine places a navy in an elite group surrounded by the United States, 
Russia, Great Britain and France, historically the maritime powers of recent centuries. 
The institutionalization of submarines is particularly difficult to measure. 
Only through the examination of the previous theories can the possibility of the 
institutional argument be utilized in a single nation case study. Based on the strength of 
the alternatives, institutional theory draws insights on how a nation-state should act if it is 
concerned with fulfilling the roles of the identity it perceives itself to hold. In comparing 
hypotheses with equal evidence, institutional influences typically would be considered an 
underlying factor rather than a primary motivation. 
B.        SUBMARINES IN THE PACIFIC 
The historical record can only provide impetus to the following submarine 
developments in Asia if the details are not examined closely. The numerous problems 
encountered by submariners during the Second World War should tend to deter submarine 
usage. A simple look would show the need to build a large force and the willingness to 
accept high losses. Both of these terms are difficult to swallow for any naval planner. If 
the accompanying tonnage of commercial shipping lost by both sides were not so high by 
1945, the low success rate against military platforms would also be a deterrent. The 
position of economic prosperity in today's national strategies makes this fact important in 
force structure development. 
1. Submarines in the World Wars 
With the German adaptation of the diesel engine combined with electric powered 
propulsion in 1906, the submarine became a formidable factor in naval warfare. During 
World War I, German submarines, known as U-boats, were used extensively against the 
Allies and Atlantic shipping. Their success was phenomenal considering the limitations of 
the ship and weapons designs. Admiral Doenitz of the German Navy described the U- 
boats of the First World War as "little more than intelligent mines."8 Anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) was ineffective until near the end of the war when ASW weapons, 
including depth charges, were developed.9 Countering the U-boat had significant impact 
on the momentum in the Atlantic. 
The First World War was the prototype for fleet submarine operations, but the 
Second World War brought their influence to the Pacific. The United States and Japan 
each had built sizable submarine fleets based on the reputation of German U-boats in the 
Atlantic. War plans were designed with submarines being utilized as support elements to 
the main battle fleet. Between the wars, the primary battle scenario of the U.S. Pacific 
fleet centered around taking the battle to the Far East, as envisaged by Plan Orange10 
U.S. submarine designers concentrated on speed and propulsion to reduce transit times 
across the Pacific. By 1941, the result was the Gato class submarine, capable of 20 knots 
on the surface. The Japanese also looked for endurance in order to inhibit the U.S. fleet's 
transit through waves of forward deployed submarine attacks. u 
The attack on Pearl Harbor changed the fate of submarines in the Pacific. Eighteen 
naval vessels were sunk or badly damaged, including eight battleships. Almost 200 
American aircraft were destroyed, and approximately 3000 naval and military personnel 
were killed or wounded. Submarines were untouched by the Japanese attack. With the 
U.S. surface fleet incapable of going on the offensive for months, the submarine was the 
Norman Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 
27. 
9
 Ibid., 32. 
10
 Keith Wheeler, War Under the Pacific (Alexandria: Time-Life Books, 1980), 23. Plan Orange was 
the standby war plan against the Japanese. It incorporated an Army garrison holding the Philippines 
while the U.S. Pacific fleet could be augmented by the U.S. Atlantic fleet via the Panama Canal 
which would then sail together to the Philippines where it would defeat the Japanese fleet in a 
single battle. 
11
 Friedman, Submarine Design and Development, 39. 
only platform able to take the war to the Japanese. By the end of the war, submarines had 
proven quite successful in the Pacific, however the first deployments were not nearly so 
glorious. Many submarine commanders were relieved of command for lack of production 
due to conservative tactics and poor weapons usage. 
There were two early problems for U.S. submarines in the Pacific. Strategic 
employment gave U.S. commanders limited opportunities for attack. Submarines were 
sortied to suspected Japanese staging areas and essentially had to wait for the enemy to 
come to them. Combined with an undetected flaw in the new Mark 14 torpedo's magnetic 
detonator, many patrols ended without a single successful attack.12 By 1943, the 
submarines were being deployed to the concentrated shipping lanes created by Asian 
geography. Torpedo faults were overridden by changing the torpedo's depth setting to 
allow the magnetic detonator to be triggered. Slowly, patrol efficiencies began to rise. By 
the end of the war, the U.S. submarines in the Pacific had been so successful that they 
nearly eliminated their own mission by sinking all available Japanese merchants. 
Japan's strategy for the war centered around the notion of a Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere. Japanese planners counted on the United States to be incapable of 
waging a two ocean war against Germany and Japan. The Japanese Empire was to be 
quickly expanded throughout East Asia in order to supply the war effort with raw 
materials. For the Imperial Navy, the goal was to engage and destroy the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet in a single decisive battle. Admiral Yamamoto conceived the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor as a means of crippling the U.S. fleet prior to leading it to its destruction. 
The submarine fleet from Japan was intended to be used as an expendable first line 
of defense if the U.S. fleet were to launch an attack westward. Japanese submarines were 
to hinder the U.S. fleet's advance and then fall back and repeat the process. Japanese rules 
of engagement used submarines primarily for attacking enemy naval forces. Merchant 
12 Wheeler, War Under the Pacific, 40-47. 
ships were secondary targets which rated only a single torpedo, hit or miss.lj This 
limitation on submarine utilization became a theme for Japanese submarines. 
At Pearl Harbor, twenty-seven fleet submarines were positioned to attack U.S. 
ships attempting to escape the area. They recorded no kills. They were not involved in the 
fighting. Five midget submarines were also intended to wreak havoc between waves in the 
air raid. This mission was a complete failure. Only one of ten crewmen survived, and he 
became the first Japanese prisoner of war. While Pearl Harbor was a complete success for 
the attackers, its undersea complement began what would be a dismal time for its entire 
submarine force. 
There were good reasons for the lack of production by Japanese submarines 
throughout the war. First, the only outstanding piece of equipment operated by the 
Japanese was the torpedo, which was designed for both high speed and long range. The 
primary disadvantage for the Japanese submarines came from the inability to design a 
high-powered transmitting tube for an accurate radar system, limiting search techniques to 
the visual range. Not until 1944 were Japan's submarines equipped with surface search 
radar. This factor alone gave the U.S. fleet a significant advantage. 
Submarine warfare has significantly impacted the outcomes of two world wars. On 
both occasions, time was available to conduct attrition campaigns and shift the balance 
with brute force and emergent technologies. This type of warfare is unlikely to be seen 
again, but these wars provided launching points for submarine warfare. The first war 
proved the potential of the platform, and generated the drive for improvement. By 1945, 
the submarine was solidly set into place alongside surface fleets and naval aviation. 
2. Submarines in the Third World 
Since the Second World War, the operational record of submarines in combat has 
been rather limited, but is most significant for the local conflicts in the Third World.14 
13
 Ibid., 97. 
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Indian frigate Khurki was sunk by a Pakistani 
submarine. Another Pakistani submarine, PNS Ghali was deployed into the Bay of Bengal, 
offshore of India's largest naval base at Vishkapatnam, but was sunk by Indian escorts. 
In 1973, Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi allegedly contracted an Egyptian submarine to 
torpedo the Queen Elizabeth II in route to Haifa with over six hundred American-Jews 
aboard. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was able to head off this action even after the 
submarine had put to sea.15 
The effectiveness of a single submarine in a littoral battlespace was illustrated 
during the Falklands War in 1982. The British Navy considered itself one of the premier 
ASW fleets of the world, but found that Argentina's single operational German designed 
Type 209 submarine, the San Luis, operated by a relatively inexperienced crew, 
successfully eluded the entire British fleet. Even though the Argentine submarine was 
ineffective as an offensive platform, British fleet operations were disrupted as they 
expended over 200 ASW weapons (torpedoes and depth charges) on greater than 300 
possible submerged contacts, of which less than a third were confirmed.16 The unfamiliar 
acoustic environment rendered the British ASW fleet ineffective due to insufficient 
training in areas similar to the Falklands operating area. 
3.        Significance of Conventional Submarines 
There are three reasons why conventional submarines are effective military 
platforms in an ocean previously dominated by the nuclear submarine: 1) the conventional 
submarine running on battery is extremely quiet and difficult to track passively as 
compared to the nuclear reactor which requires support equipment to run continuously; 2) 
the smaller hull of a diesel submarine presents a smaller active target cross-section and 
14
 Andres de Lionis, "Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Third World," Jane's Intelligence Review 
(April 1994): 188. 
15
 Ibid., 188. 
16
 James Fitzgerald and John Benedict, "There is a Submarine Threat," Proceedings X, no. x (August 
1990): 63. 
10 
hence less active return; and 3) in the coastal regions, the acoustic environment creates 
false targets due to reverberation or masks a contact due to high ambient and shipping 
noise. This is where the conventional submarines are most likely to be operated due to 
speed and range limitations.17 
The existence of even poorly trained and equipped submarine forces must be 
considered a threat at some level. The alleged incident with Queen Elizabeth II exhibits 
the value of a submarine in state sponsored terrorism. This event also correlates to the 
ease with which commerce raiding could be conducted by crews with limited training. The 
developing Asian navies are modernizing and developing superior forces as compared to 
those exhibited in the Indo-Pakistani conflict or Falklands War. Therefore, these forces 
must be evaluated as a potential threat. 
Third World submarine fleets have two very different kinds of significance. 
According to Lionis, the Third World, including some developing regions of Asia, has the 
potential to become even more unstable in the future. Naval forces operating in these 
regions, for any mission, will have to account for the conventional submarine threat. 
Diesel-electric submarines are chosen as a low cost alternative to counter the high value 
ships of a major fleet, such as carriers or cruisers. Secondly, these small fleets will only 
grow. The Third World is the primary arms market for countries such as Russia and 
Germany, willing to negotiate sales throughout the world. No fewer than 44 countries 
maintain submarines, including: China, Japan, India, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia (Singapore has ordered submarines and Malaysia is 
training submarine crews). Of the current and anticipated orders for naval vessels, Asian 
navies make up the majority of these orders.18 Continued economic growth in this region 
17
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is expected to translate into some level of increased naval development, which will include 
undersea assets well beyond the current capability. 
C.        UNDERSEA WARFARE 
Submarine warfare of the nineties bears little resemblance to the more commonly 
thought of world war or cold war operations. Even the employment of conventional 
submarines is changing today. These changes are a result of technology and the adaptation 
of advances to a submerged weapons platform. The fundamental operations for safely 
navigating a submarine have remained constant. The weapons and sensors operate in the 
same basic fashion as 1945, but have significantly improved. Torpedoes are smarter, and 
cruise missiles give a submarine greater stand-off range, while the basic principles are 
constant. Sonar systems are more sensitive, but submarines are much quieter. With the 
exception of cruise missile attacks, all submarine missions of today could have been 
executed in a limited manner four decades ago. The primary innovation which created the 
true submarine, with indefinite endurance, was the transition from diesel-electric to nuclear 
propulsion. 
1. Conventional Submarines (SSK) 
The design of the conventional submarine utilizes diesel engines to drive 
generators which in turn charge large storage batteries. Propulsion is drawn from an 
electrical motor turning the shaft. In some designs, a diesel engine may be available as an 
alternative to drive the shaft. The operation of a diesel requires an external source of 
oxygen. During the Second World War, the snorkel was developed to allow shallow 
submerged operation with only the snorkel pipe and a periscope breaking the surface. This 
greatly lowered the possibility of visual detection. Previously, snorkeling had to be 
completed at night to use the cover of darkness. 
12 
Twenty years ago, a conventional submarine was required to snorkel at least once 
a day in order to recharge batteries. This evolution eliminated the primary advantage of a 
submarine. Snorkeling is an extremely noisy evolution thus giving up the submarine's 
position to any sonar system in the area. Another side effect of snorkeling is the reduced 
capability of own ship's sonar. The running diesel can mask other contacts in the area. 
This is both a tactical and ship's safety problem. Besides the noise issue, snorkeling places 
the submarine on or near the surface for extended periods of time, making it more 
vulnerable to visual detection than deep submergence operations. Speed is restricted to 
prevent mast damage, but this also prevents a submarine from continuing its transit and 
limits maneuverability. The length of time between charges can be extended through 
judicious use of the battery, including low speed operations and reduced internal electrical 
loading. Battery advancements have extended the period between required charges, but 
the need to snorkel remains the primary restriction on a commander's tactics. Other 
disadvantages of conventional submarines include low power capacity, limiting the 
systems which can be installed, and limitations on weapons load-outs, reducing platform 
firepower. 
The diesel-electric submarine has many advantages as well. This lower cost 
platform is capable of carrying out multiple missions without exposing itself to detection. 
Current designs can stay at sea for up to fifty days and operate silent for as much as three 
to four days between snorkeling. Quiet operations at low speeds can be nearly 
undetectable by passive sonar. Battery operations do not require the operation of rotating 
equipment, a primary source of noise. In a battle scenario, a commander can shut down 
systems not needed for combat, making a submarine on batteries look, or sound, like a 
hole in the water. Additionally, the smaller hull of the conventional platform allows for 
greater maneuverability and less surface area to reflect active sonar emissions as described 
earlier. 
19
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2.        Nuclear Submarines (SSN or SSBN) 
Nuclear propulsion eliminated the need for access to outside air, except for the 
comfort of the crew. In creating a larger power source, the reactor plant required 
additional support equipment. The basic operating principle behind submarine nuclear 
power is the nuclear fuel being controlled at critical mass and generating a heat source (or 
as we like to call it, 'making the rock hot'). The primary coolant, typically pure water, is 
cycled through the core and a secondary heat exchanger. This creates steam in a system 
isolated from the nuclear material, in order to drive propulsion and create electrical power 
via turbine generators. Under conditions where the reactor is unavailable to provide 
power, the submarine must operate in a manner similar to a conventional submarine, 
however battery capacity cannot support extended operations on the larger ship and may 
require diesel operations. 
The nuclear propulsion plant is extremely demanding. The development of nuclear 
propulsion requires a national commitment to an expensive and demanding system. The 
design of the reactor must incorporate safeguards to prevent nuclear accidents. Personnel 
must be trained to operate and maintain the reactor to prevent the design safeguards from 
ever being needed. 
The downside to nuclear power is in the many support systems needed. Each 
rotating pump is a potential sound source which must be isolated to prevent transmission 
of vibrations to the hull and into the surrounding waters. Propulsion is routed through a 
reduction gear in order to allow the propulsion turbine and the shaft to operate at their 
most efficient rates, but again this adds a potential noise source. The very system which 
creates the submarine's total stealth may in turn give it away.20 
The advantages of nuclear propulsion go beyond the indefinite submerged 
operation. The reactor generates much greater propulsion increasing the top speed of the 
platform while allowing it to remain at this speed for extended periods. High speed transits 
20
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can be conducted to put a submarine at the scene of a crisis in minimal time without 
exposing the platform. The reactor dictates the need for a larger hull, which then allows 
for greater capacity for weapons, stores and personnel. The reactor provides a large 
power source capable of operating more sophisticated weapons and ship's control 
systems. 
3.        Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) 
AIP is being designed as a means of closing the endurance gap between 
conventional and nuclear submarines. The principle behind AIP is to provide a low power 
electrical source to supplement the battery without the requirement of an external air 
source. Utilizing slow speed submerged operations, an AIP system is sufficient to maintain 
a füll charge on the battery extending the time between snorkel operations up to two 
weeks or more. 
Four primary designs have been considered by various builders. A closed-cycle 
diesel recycles its exhaust, by combining it with a mixture of oxygen and fuel to maintain a 
continuous, efficient combustion process. This process is limited by its need to store or 
discharge some portion of the exhaust. The key to air independence is in the use of liquid 
oxygen. Closed cycle diesels have been successful in extending submerged operations for 
up to three weeks in a small submersible. A second design, the Sterling engine is a 
reciprocating, external combustion, engine. Unlike the common internal combustion 
engine, the Sterling engine utilizes continuous burning in an external chamber. The heated 
gases operate upon one of two thermodynamically linked pistons. The opposite piston's 
force is generated by a separate working gas (helium) which is heated and cooled through 
a regenerator/cooler. The gases are kept at pressure to facilitate overboard discharge. The 
key to the Sterling engine is again the use of liquid oxygen. Its primary advantage is that it 
is relatively quiet compared to a diesel, due to the lack of explosions and low engine 
revolutions per minute.21 
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The remaining forms of AIP differ greatly. The German Navy is attempting 
overcome the need for an oxygen source with fuel cell technology. Fuel cells do not 
require heat transfer or combustion. This process directly converts chemical reactions into 
electrical energy, with a potential up to five times greater than standard lead-acid batteries. 
The primary advantage of fuel cell technology is that it is virtually silent, operating without 
the need for rotating machinery. If current difficulties can be overcome, this method may 
provide upwards of a month of submerged, silent operations. The final and most expensive 
method is sometimes characterized as a "nuclear battery charger." A low power reactor, 
operating on the same principles as the main reactor for a SSN or SSBN could provide for 
virtually unlimited submerged operations at low speeds. 
These technologies are quickly becoming reality. The proliferation of these systems 
in new and upgraded conventional submarines will greatly change the ASW equation. 
Greater endurance and quieter operations present a challenge to anyone attempting to 
locate and track these platforms. Although AIP designs are being developed in Europe, 
the emerging arms market in Asia will be a primary sales target. Japan has begun testing of 
the Sterling design and Pakistan has ordered AIP equipped platforms from France. The 
original designs may not be Asian, but the application of AIP technology will have an 
impact on the undersea balance of Asia. 
4.        Acquisition Process 
The submarine procurement process is broken down into three basic areas, 
operational need definition, infrastructure development and personnel training. The first 
phase of the process is carried out by all naval planners. In determining if need exists for 
submarine procurement, the planner must examine costs and benefits of a submarine 
program against maritime threats and national capabilities to establish a program. Within 
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these decisions, a navy will determine the specific submarine design to accept based on the 
expected operating environment, intended missions and cost. As is the case for many of 
the Asian-Pacific navies, I will assume the result of this process is to procure a submarine 
fleet of undetermined size. 
The various submarine fleets of Asia range in size from two submarines in 
Indonesia to the eighty-four Chinese submarines. According to Henri Cazaban and Noel 
Clavelloux, in order to establish a cost effective fleet, the initial order should be at least 
three or four submarines. A fleet of two submarines may only be sufficient to provide 
training for local ASW forces. "Having four submarine also makes it possible to reach the 
submarine crew critical mass and trouble free-management."23 The lower limit of four is 
based on a need to have two submarines operationally ready at all times. 
a.        Infrastructure needs 
The typical process for fleet development begins with purchase of a 
submarine from an exporting country. However, long before the platform arrives, 
infrastructure should be developed to support the vessel. With the exception of Laos, each 
nation in this region has facilities capable of home porting a small conventional submarine. 
Docking and electrical requirements are very similar to the needs of a small surface 
combatant and could be quickly adapted to support a submarine. 
Maintenance needs are a more difficult issue. An operational submarine 
requires periodic downtime to examine the ships hull and systems and to repair any 
problems. These refit periods are in addition to the normal repairs that occur during inport 
periods. Because an imported submarine cannot be returned to the manufacturer for 
repairs, naval infrastructure must be developed to carry out refits and repairs. Many of the 
technologies used on submarines are also utilized in modern surface ships and thus, the 
23
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base for a maintenance infrastructure may already be in place. However, the submarine- 
specific technologies dealing with hulls, deep submergence and diving-safety installations 
are crucial for crew safety. The primary technologies involved include specific forms of 
welding or precision machining for systems exposed to sea pressure. For navies 
developing nuclear propulsion, the list is expanded greatly to support the nuclear reactor 
and associated systems.24 
One recent method to overcome the need to develop massive infrastructure 
has been the contracting of "through life support" from the builder, creating a relationship 
between the buyer and the prime contractor or sub-contractors. Asian Defense Journal 
quotes a Dutch naval consultant who emphasizes the need "for through-life support 
assistance...for the first seven years after the initial commissioning of the last submarine." 
Assistance is intended to help the purchasing navy by keeping the vessels operational while 
supporting the transfer of maintenance capabilities to the purchaser. One common 
difficulty in this area is the transfer of adequate documentation. The drawings and 
specifications are crucial to the repair and upkeep of ships systems. The Royal Australian 
Navy still finds occasional problems in the documentation for the Oberon class, a British 
design, even as it comes to the end of its hull life.26 
Indigenous construction of a submarine requires expansion of the above 
infrastructure. In most cases, this occurs through a phased building program. The first 
hulls may be built in the designers shipyard. Subsequent hulls are the constructed on site 
from prepackaged assemblies under the supervision of consultants from the builder in 
order to establish site expertise. Each subsequent hull is then built from a more basic 
package with the aim of a fully independent program. 
24
 Peter Lewis Young, "Submarine Procurement: Some Speculations on the Process of Buying a 
Submarine," Asian Defence Journal (June 1991) 16, and Cazaban and Clavelloux, "Creating a 
Submarine Force," 46. 
25
 Young, "Submarine Procurement," 12. 
26
 Ibid., 12. 
18 
b.        Training needs 
The training needs for a submarine fleet are divided into two areas, 
maintenance and operations. Training programs should encompass all aspects from basic 
systems design through advanced operations and maintenance. In order for a navy to 
acquire the expertise needed, the training process should begin in conjunction with the 
initial platform order. As a part of the purchase contract, personnel can be trained 
alongside the building country's navy or with a third party submarine force. The latter 
option is more likely to be chosen if the building navy does not operate the same 
submarines that are exported. For instance the German navy does not operate the Type 
209 as a part of its fleet, but rather uses the smaller Type 205 or 206. The local operating 
area may also be a factor in deciding where to train a crew. Beginning with no submarine 
experience, adequately training a full crew would take two to three years. To prepare the 
submarine commander may take as much as six years to develop tactical experience and 
submarine handling expertise.27 
In addition to preparing a crew to receive a submarine, naval training must 
be developed to sustain crew turnovers. This level of training is accomplished through the 
development of a naval submarine school teaching all facets of submarine operations. 
Major requirements include the need for navigational, ship control and weapons systems 
simulators. Simulators are needed to train personnel in casualty or wartime situations 
which would be not only expensive, but too dangerous to conduct with the actual 
submarines. 
5.        Operating Areas 
The operating areas expected for a submarine fleet will determine the submarine 
design best suited for that navy. Based on the area's characteristics, a navy may have to 
make trade-offs in maneuverability or range, based on the mission requirements. 
27
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a. Deep Basins 
The deep basins of the Pacific or Indian Oceans were the undersea battle 
space for the cold war. This is where nuclear powered submarines were best suited to 
operate. Large areas require the indefinite endurance and high speed capabilities of nuclear 
propulsion in order to conduct searches for other submarines. The acoustic characteristics 
of a deep basin are fairly consistent and provide for much longer range detection. The 
battle then became the quest to detect the enemy first and approach it without counter- 
detection by exploiting the acoustic environment. Environmental conditions can create 
areas from which a submarine can listen, but not be heard. Most important is maintaining 
position outside the enemy sensor's ability to detect your submarine. 
b. Shallow Water/Coastal Regions 
The shallow water regions, typical of the waters close to Asia, provide a 
very different challenge to the ASW problem. The ability for a submarine to gain long 
range passive detection of another submarine is nearly eliminated. The acoustic 
environment provides advantage to the evading platform. Ambient noise levels are high 
due to biologies and dense commercial shipping. Noise levels will tend to mask a relatively 
quiet submarine. Noise that is emitted is also difficult to track due to inconsistent 
acoustical environments. Active sonar tracking is equally limited by sound scattering, 
reverberation or bottom absorption. The small cross-sectional size of the conventional 
submarine hull adds to the difficulty of active detection due to a smaller return echo. 
The submarine's size is important in the coastal regions. A smaller 
submarine will be more maneuverable and may be able to operate safer in dense shipping 
due to low vertical dimensions. The limited amount of water below the keel in shallow 
areas places safety restrictions on larger, in particular nuclear, submarines to prevent the 
submarine from impacting the ocean floor in the case of a ship control casualty. 
20 
D.        SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE IN ASIA 
1. China 
The People's Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN) has built the third largest submarine 
fleet in the world behind the United States and Russia. The majority of Chinese assets are 
very old and limited in their ability. Disregarding the Romeo class submarines, the PLAN 
has improved its modern platforms in the last decade through construction and purchase. 
The Ming class diesel submarines are beginning to fill the gap as the many older 
submarines decay. The purchase of three Kilo class submarines from Russia represents a 
large step in modernizing their fleet. The Chinese nuclear propulsion program is also 
gaining momentum after the difficulties of developing the first Han class SSN. Six nuclear 
propelled submarines are operating, including the Xia class ballistic missile submarine. 
Chinese intentions to develop a blue water navy remain unclear, but the current 
actions in the South China Sea indicate their desire to control the seas regionally. The 
South China Sea is ideal for conventional submarine operations with the offensive 
advantages provided by the poor acoustic environment!28 
2. India 
India has developed a small conventional submarine fleet capable of enhancing 
India's goal of being the primary regional influence. India has proven the ability to build 
the German designed Type 209/1500 at the Mazagon Docks near Bombay. They have also 
been provided the plans for constructing the Kilo class which they currently operate in the 
Bay of Bengal. The Indian submarine fleet consists of four Shishumar class (Type 209) 
and eight Shankul class (Kilo) submarines, all of which have been added since 1985. In 
addition, eight aging Foxtrot class submarines are nearing the end of operability and are 
Acoustic systems capabilities are degraded for all platforms operating in these conditions giving the 
unit attempting to hide the significant advantage. If attempting ASW operations, the conventional 
submarine would be at the same disadvantage as a nuclear platform, assuming equivalent sonar 
equipment. 
21 
utilized primarily for training.29 As the only Asian navy to have engaged in submarine 
combat since World War II, India can be counted on to maintain their submarine fleet to 
further their goal of a balanced naval force structure. 
3. Japan 
Japan's concern for the sea lines around Asia has solidified submarines in their 
naval strategy. The ineffective performance of World War II did not diminish the resolve 
to maintain a modern submarine fleet. For the past 25 years, Japanese construction has 
averaged almost one platform per year. Seven new designs have been developed over the 
past three decades. The current inventory of 19 submarines, all of Japanese design, is one 
of the world's most up-to-date SSK forces. 
4. Other Asian Navies 
In the power vacuum which developed after the naval pullouts from Subic Bay and 
Cam Ranh Bay, China and India may be the largest navies trying to fill the void, but the 
other nations are also developing in order to ensure their own security. 
North Korea and South Korea each have submarine fleets. North Korea's 
submarines were supplied from the Soviet Union or China. They are now placing the 
emphasis on mini-submarines with purposes of mine warfare or ground force insertions. 
South Korea is one of the world's newest submarine manufacturers and operators. South 
Korean industry has built four Type 209s under license, and will produce five more by the 
end of the century. Although the two Korean fleets are built to counter each other, the 
eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula would combine two complimenting 
submarine forces and must be accounted for in long term planning. 
Taiwan has maintained two Guppy class submarines and modernized them. In 
1987, two Dutch submarines were transferred to Taiwan under protest from the People's 
29 Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane 's Fighting Ships 1994-95, (London, Jane's Defence Data, 1994): 280. 
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Republic of China (PRC). A subsequent order for additional hulls was then blocked by the 
PRC. Other avenues for submarine acquisition are still being pursued by Taiwan's navy. 
Southeast Asia's position around the access to the Indian Ocean makes naval 
strategy important to many nations. Although Indonesia has typically placed their 
economy before the military, it has replaced its ineffective fleet of ex-Soviet Whiskey class 
submarines with the German Type 209 design.30 They have operated the first two since 
1981, and upgraded them in 1989. Two additional platforms are on order for delivery 
before the turn of the century. New facilities are being built on Sumatra to support these 
submarines which will enhance their surveillance of the Strait of Malacca. Malaysia has 
approved the acquisition of two to four submarines, but had placed the order on hold due 
to budget constraints. Singapore's location makes it a primary candidate to operate 
submarines. After difficulties arose in negotiations with the German Navy, Singapore 
turned to Sweden for its submarine contacts. According to Walters, "Without a common 
enemy, and thus a common defense policy, there is too much at stake. Countries are still 
suspicious and ever watchful of naval purchases and improvements which could threaten 
their economic miracle."31 Each country in Southeast Asia must determine how to meet its 
own perceived security threats, and submarines are becoming a popular option. 
Pakistan has been a long-standing submarine operator with platforms provided by 
the French. Pakistan's professed rationale for its fleet is to counter Indian superiority. This 
premise continues as Pakistan modernizes its submarines through the acquisition of three 
AIP equipped French Agosta-B submarines. 
This thesis will examine the motivational factors behind submarine acquisitions for 
India, the People's Republic of China and Japan. The hypotheses discussed earlier provide 
unique insights into each case study in order to further the overall understanding. The 
technological differences between nuclear and conventional submarines adds an additional 
30
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facet to the study, as the motivations for acquiring these platforms are as different as the 
the submarines themselves. 
24 
II.      INDIA 
The development of a nuclear submarine by a nation characterized by a widely 
varied dual economy raises many questions as to why a country would take on a project of 
this magnitude. India's immense industrial complex is contrasted with a poor and 
inefficient agrarian sector. The massive population of India survives on a GNP per capita 
ranking India near the bottom in terms of this traditional indicator of development. A first 
glance analysis does not provide any answers for the motivation behind such an 
undertaking. Alongside its nuclear development, the Indian Navy has acquired the 
strongest conventional submarine fleet in the Indian Ocean.32 This case study will 
distinguish the motivations behind these two programs and the differences between them. 
The five major hypothesis from chapter one are analyzed. The conclusion varies 
around platform type, nuclear vs. conventional. An enormous program, such as naval 
nuclear propulsion, requires a great deal of momentum and funding. This case study 
shows that a factional interest group, the nuclear establishment in this case, is required to 
provide the push from below for funding and support. At the decision making level, or the 
political elite, the 'status' or high 'social value' associated with a nuclear submarine can 
justify the cost when security threats could be countered using lower cost alternatives. 
The conventional diesel-electric submarine is an excellent instrument of the Navy 
for providing national security. The perceived and potential maritime threats to India all 
spell out the need for a balanced Navy with emphasis on subsurface warfare. Threat is not 
the only shaping factor for the submarine fleet. Proponents for the submarine community 
have been instrumental in the shaping of the force structure which has developed. 
32 Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1994-95 (London: Jane's Defence Data, 1994): 280-81. 
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A.       INDIAN SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
After achieving independence from the British, and concentrating the majority of 
the defense budget on the land-based fighting capability, India passed through a period of 
naval build-up which was slow, and centered around what ships were available from the 
British Navy. With the additional fuel applied to the build-up of general forces following 
the conflict with the Chinese in 1962, the Navy benefited, as well as her sister services. 
The predominant supplier shifted to the Soviet Union. By the late 1970s, modern warships 
were being purchased from the Soviets, and to a lesser extent from Western Europe, to 
maintain balance in the name of non-alignment. As the Indian industrial base was able to 
absorb technology procured through the build-up, it was able to begin supplementing the 
purchases of naval platforms with indigenous construction. 
All of the above policies were a matter of concern in the development of the Indian 
submarine fleet. India is the only navy in the world incorporating both Soviet and Western 
submarine technology. Between 1968 and 1975, India received eight Foxtrot class diesel 
submarines from the Soviet Union. These platforms have since deteriorated to a level of 
readiness only sufficient for training or minor deployments." As spare parts became more 
difficult to procure from Russia, these submarines have been increasingly restricted to the 
pier and the first two hulls were cannibalized for parts. Of the remaining six, a maximum 
of three are seaworthy at any one time. Overall, the Foxtrots are declining. Only INS 
Vagsheer will undergo upgrades while the rest may be withdrawn from service by 1996.34 
In 1981, the Indian Navy looked outside the Soviet Union and signed an 
agreement with Howaldtswerke (HDW) of West Germany for the addition of four Type 
209/1500 class diesel submarines.35 The first two were purchased and delivered in 1987. 
The remainder of the agreement was for the construction of two additional boats at the 
33
 Ibid., 280-81. 
34
 Ibid., 280. 
35 Ibid., 281. 
26 
Mazagon Dock Ltd. (MDL) in Bombay. All parts were supplied by HDW for their 
construction in Bombay. The contract provided for advisors and training for the Indian 
designers and shipbuilders. The construction process took over two years for each 
submarine. The period between launching and commissioning was longer than expected, 
but the lessons learned should be valuable in anticipating problems for future construction. 
Negotiations began for licensing of two additional Type 209s for MDL, but the contract 
was canceled by the Indians due to suspected corruption and charges of contract breeches 
over technology transfers.36 In 1992, these issues were reconsidered and the fifth and sixth 
hulls were licensed. This platform adds significantly to the capability of the submarine 
fleet and will remain operational well into the next century. 
Looking back to the Soviet Union, India was able to reach agreement over the 
purchase of the Kilo class diesel submarine. The Kilos are the most advanced diesel boat 
built by the Soviets and represented a significant commitment to India. The first nation 
authorized to purchase this design, India acquired eight hulls between 1986 and 1991. 
More important though is the lease of an ex-Soviet Charlie-I class nuclear 
powered cruise missile submarine. This remains the only instance of a nuclear submarine 
being transferred to another nation. The three year lease was not extended and the 
submarine was returned to Vladivostock in January 1991. 
Although interest still exists within India for the purchase of a modern nuclear 
propelled guided missile submarine (SSGN), the Indian Navy has kept a nuclear 
propulsion program slowly simmering on the back burner for many years with moderate 
funding continuously available. A program for naval application of nuclear power began 
in 1971 by the civilian nuclear establishment in conjunction with the navy.37 A number of 
reactors have been proposed, but have been put aside due design flaws. The workings of 
this bureaucracy, to be described later, have likely kept this program from getting off of 
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the ground, while still maintaining the lobby to keep moderate funding available. This 
program has received priority treatment over even the construction of an aircraft carrier. 
In the words of VADM Govil: "In the earlier days, we took what came, but today we 
endeavor to make what we want."38 Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96 reports the Indian 
nuclear submarine program to have tested a shore based reactor and expects the first keel 
for an SSGN to be laid at Vishkapatnam by 1996. This activity is significant progress, but 
the launching of an SSGN will still be well into the future. 
B.       COMPARING NUCLEAR AND DIESEL SUBMARINES FOR INDIA 
For each of the above hypotheses, the platform capability, cost or value can have 
an effect on the results of the study. In order to evaluate these arguments properly, the 
differences between a nuclear and conventional submarine must be laid out clearly. 
Chapter I contains a basic description of nuclear and conventional platforms and the areas 
in which they operate. The more intangible elements such as sound silencing or system 
performance are addressed, but are based on my opinions and limited experience and have 
only a minor input to the final results. 
The two primary diesel hulls employed by the Indian Navy are the German Type 
209 and the ex-Soviet Kilo class submarines. The range of each of these platforms allows 
it to reach major choke points for entrance into the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, 
Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz, from any naval base in India. Deployments of this 
range would be limited by the ability to remain on station, depending significantly on the 
point of last replenishment. The Kilo would exert roughly half of its endurance in the five 
to seven day transit, leaving a approximately twenty days on station at five knots while 
snorkeling. The endurance will be altered if submerged transits are conducted at high 
speed.   A commander's competence in use of the battery and propulsion significantly 
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changes his ability to complete a mission. Fully submerged operations and particularly, 
sprints to position the boat tactically will affect time on station. The Type 209 has twenty- 
five percent more range and higher speed improving its response and transit times. If 
surface transits are feasible, ranges are nearly doubled, but this eliminates most of the 
advantage gained by sending a submarine. In comparison, a nuclear submarine's 
endurance is not an issue. It can submerge directly after leaving port and remain 
undetected until it returns. Transit times are reduced by the higher transit speeds which 
can be maintained. Maneuvers on station do not limit endurance. The nuclear submarine 
is theoretically only restricted by its crew's ability to stay at sea. 
According to Jane's Fighting Ships 1994-95, the types of weapons carried on any 
of these platforms will be fairly similar. The primary offensive and defensive weapon for a 
submarine is the torpedo. The Kilo carries a total of eighteen weapons, fourteen for the 
Type 209. One major difference between these designs is that the Type 209 is capable of 
deploying external strap-on mines, where the Kilo must off-load torpedoes to 
accommodate this mission. The radar and fire control systems are of good quality but are 
likely limited by the level of upgrades provided by the suppliers. India's nuclear design 
will be modeled after the Soviet Charlie-I SSGN.39 The major addition for this platform is 
its anti-surface warfare mission design, with externally mounted sub-surface to surface 
missile launchers. This mission capability enhances the ability of a single boat to control a 
choke point. The disadvantage is that external targeting assistance is required to take full 
advantage of this platform and as soon as an SSGN goes on the offensive, it must move to 
the defensive as its location has been given away with smoke trails pointing to the launch 
point. 
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C.       TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
1.        National Security - Threat Based 
After the conflict with China in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, India 
began to refocus its assessment of the security threats to the nation. Based on the 
"Cinderella" posture given to the navy prior to this, it was only feasible that any 
reassessment would have to raise the level of awareness to maritime security. The Indian 
subcontinent juts out with 7562 km of coastline, including islands, on the Bay of Bengal, 
Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The overseas trade of greater than Rs 40,000 crore 
(approx. US $25 billion) or 139 million tons of cargo emanates from the eleven major 
ports plus the over 200 medium and intermediate ports.40 The development of the 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) created an additional region of 200 million sq. km for 
India's maritime control. However, seaborne economic assets cannot be considered solely 
as a determining factor for naval power or else countries such as Panama and Liberia 
would need enormous navies. 
In addition to their own interests in this region, India must consider the presence of 
extra- regional navies which justify their presence via politico-economic-military terms. 
"The use of coercive power by large navies was unambiguously established in 1971 by the 
USS Enterprise and it is only reasonable to expect an independent, nonaligned, nation- 
state like India to resist such infringement of its sovereignty."42 During the cold war, the 
United States and Soviet Union played their game of presence and deterrence in the Indian 
Ocean. With the reduction to one superpower, there remains no solid check for the U.S. 
Navy's influence in the area. Additionally, the Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN) 
40
 C. Uday Bhaskar, "The Indian Navy: Rhetoric, Reality and Rationale," Indian Defence Review: 35. 
41
 Ibid., 39. 
42
 Ibid., 39. 
30 
has been making significant strides to extending their presence westward as will discussed 
later. 
The responsibilities of the Indian Navy, as professed by senior Indian naval officials 
includes: protection of: 1) ports and sea lines of communication (SLOC); 2) the island 
territories; 3) fishery resources; 4) offshore oil installations; 5) Indian shipping and 6) 
seabed exploration.43 Although there does not currently exist an outright and overt threat 
to India from the sea, the situation does not allow them to ignore possibilities. Because of 
the very long lead time to build up naval strength, "The size of the Navy should be 
determined by the country's geostrategic location, its self perceived role and the need for 
the growth of naval muscle, both qualitative and quantitative, in parallel with continuing 
expansion of its maritime assets."44 Although the sea is open to all and the threat could 
come from many directions, India is shaping its naval force structure around those they 
perceive as possible adversaries. 
a.        Pakistan 
In spite of the fact that the conflicts between India and Pakistan have been 
generally restricted to land, the Pakistanis do maintain a naval force capable of threatening 
India to some extent. If based on maritime affairs, the smaller coastline and single major 
port would dictate a force one- seventh the size of India. In contrast, the two navies will 
be closely equivalent based on expected receipts of surface combatants in Karachi.45 
Naval conflicts have been limited between these nations. In 1965, Pakistan gained a 
limited victory against an inept Indian force. By 1971, India was able to blockade and 
bombard Pakistan, both East and West. The sinking of the PNS Ghali was a victory, and 
illustrated a submarine's ability to threaten Vishkapatnam.  Pakistan has since added new 
43
 S. P. Govil, "Why the Navy? Its Role and Responsibilities," Indian Defence Review 8, no. 3 (July 
1993): 64. 
44
 Ibid., 65. 
'' Bhaskar, "The Indian Navy," 39. 
31 
weapons systems including Exocet missiles on the Atlantique aircraft and submarine 
launched Harpoons. They are also attempting to acquire the Harpoon to be fitted to the 
P-3 Orion.46 These weapons extend their strike capability, to threaten surface forces, oil 
platforms, port installations and merchant shipping as well as improving ASW capabilities. 
Submarines play a crucial role in Pakistan's naval strategy, as a qualitative 
equalizing factor against the quantitative Indian superiority.47 The Pakistani submarine 
fleet is much smaller, in numbers and ship design, but still holds the capacity to attack 
Indian assets, particularly through port mining operations and the new Harpoon capability. 
There are rumors over Pakistani requests for the purchase of a Han class SSN from the 
People's Republic of China, but the 1994 agreement with France is more important. The 
French agreement is to provide three Agosta 90-B class submarines equipped with air 
independent propulsion (AIP). These boats will replace the aging Daphne class while 
adding a significant technological upgrade. AIP would allow these submarines to remain 
submerged between battery charges nearly five times longer. It does not provide the 
extended speed capacity of a nuclear platform, but does enhance the overall flexibility for 
the submarine commander. 
"It is clear that the advanced technology systems present in Pakistani 
submarines would enable the vessels to pose a far more complex threat to Indian naval 
merchant ships. The defense of Karachi would also be enhanced further. Such a state of 
affairs would be exacerbated by the natural erosion of India's own submarine fleet in the 
next few years."48 With the loss of the Foxtrots and the need to split forces between the 
East and West coasts, the numbers for the subsurface battle tend to slide toward Pakistan, 
decreasing the ASW gap. 
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b. China 
As China's economy seems to be on the upswing, so too does their naval 
expansion. Since the 1970s, their emphasis has evolved from a "brown water" coastal 
defense to looking to the "blue water." By 1990, the PLAN had developed into the largest 
Asian navy in front of Japan and India. "The development of the PLAN appears to be 
planned in three phases spread over a period of thirty plus years."49 The remainder of this 
decade may see China expanding its naval presence and its ability to respond to regional 
events. If the build-up continues, China would become capable of showing its flag all 
around the world eventually working towards assuming the "mantle of a major global sea 
power." Of particular concern to India is the development of seaborne logistics, the 
planned acquisition of an aircraft carrier and, most critically, the construction of facilities 
in the Indian Ocean. Although, PLAN visits to the Indian Ocean Region have been 
infrequent, assistance to Myanmar since 1991 and port calls to Karachi indicate that 
Chinese presence is on the rise. The current threat to India can be assumed to be minimal, 
as logistics are in the India's favor. "However, in the near future, possibly as early as the 
turn of the decade, the maritime dimension of the Chinese military threat to India will 
increase in intensity" and may develop into a rivalry over influence in the region.50 
c. United States 
Beginning with the deployment of USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal in 
1971, India has recognized the message that the United States is "willing to intervene, in 
naval terms, in any development in any area that Washington considered inimical to its 
interests."51 With the U.S. Navy based in Diego Garcia, and the continued presence of 
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deployed forces in the Western Pacific, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the United States 
is capable of responding to any event in a rapid fashion. Up until the 1990s, India could 
feel somewhat secure with the presence of Soviet forces to counter U.S. presence. With 
no balance remaining, the residual superpower could seem quite threatening while India 
attempts to build its own regional influence. 
d. Other Perceived Threats 
Other possible concerns for India include Japan, Iran, Indonesia and 
Australia. Japan simply has a larger and more technologically advanced navy. Their 
significant interests in the trade route from the Middle East will likely force the decision to 
extend their clout on all sides of Asia to ensure they can protect their source of vital 
energy resources. Iran's rapid naval development indicates their resolve to have an 
influence in the region as well, and their construction of nine midget submarines adds an 
element of tension to the Persian Gulf. Any ties between Iran, Pakistan and China would 
definitely be of concern to India. Indonesia and Australia have also shown concern for 
their interests in the area and have used their navies to send the message. Cooperation 
between India and these forces has been demonstrated through joint exercises, but this 
does not preclude the outside chance of conflict.52 
e. Analysis 
Accepting the geostrategic argument and regional dominance as primary 
for India's overall naval strategy, the question of whether or not a submarine is the 
appropriate platform to center on must be discussed. The only significant capability the 
Pakistani Navy maintains is its sub-surface force. The chance that Pakistan may level the 
playing field with a limited number of submarines, and the increased likelihood of this 
scenario should the AIP platforms be acquired, provides sufficient argument for the 
current force structure of Indian submarines. Against the Chinese threat, the submarine is 
52
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best suited to choke point interdiction while avoiding the visible presence of a surface 
fleet. If China materializes as a true presence in the Indian Ocean with bases in Myanmar, 
then a surface fleet will play a much larger role. In both of the situations, the ability to 
launch an anti-ship cruise missile would shift the advantage to India. 
Against the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the United States 
Navy, India could only hope for to deter U.S. forces by being able to get close and utilize 
surprise. Weapons range superiority would keep the Indian surface fleet at a distance 
rendering them ineffective. Submarines could attempt to slip inside the escort ring to inflict 
damage, but at the risk of losing an uneven exchange. 
Each of these threat scenarios provides justification for submarine warfare, 
but when limited to the Indian Ocean, and short order battles, these missions can all be 
accomplished by conventional submarines. "Conventional submarines can be deployed on 
patrol independently and far away from [Indian] shores in all kinds of weather and off 
enemy ports. Looking at areas around [India] a fleet of 12-15 conventional submarines 
would be the minimum needed to fulfill these tasks."53 Upgrades in weaponry and/or 
propulsion (adding AIP) would solidify this force at a much lower cost as compared to the 
nuclear option. A larger diesel fleet could provide greater flexibility over a minimum 
complement of nuclear vessels, but at the cost of mission response capability. Therefore, 
the national security argument has shaped the overall development of the conventional 
submarine fleet, but does not sufficiently justify the cost of nuclear propulsion. 
2.        Factional Interests 
Since 1978 when the Navy's twenty year plan was developed, it needed an internal 
ability to present its needs to the Ministry of Defence. The nature of naval procurement 
and shipbuilding both require a long term view in planning to ensure funding for 
construction and the placement of orders to exporting countries. The time lag from design 
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to delivery could be as long as ten years and the international procurement is rarely much 
better. Budgetary constraints have always been tight for the Indian Navy. The submarine 
community has been able to work within these barriers to acquire or produce platforms 
(for example, two indigenously built Type 209s) in times when the rest of the fleet did not 
receive a single new ship. This influence was able to have 3.5 percent of total military 
expenditures allocated for submarines when these boats comprised only fourteen percent 
of the Navy.54 
For conventional submarines, naval interests would have been supported by 
Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL). India has been able to build a sizable military-industrial 
complex over the years with the primary segment being made of the Public Sector 
Undertakings (PSUs). This group employs over 300,000 people making them one of the 
largest employers in the nation. The top four PSUs, including MDL, account for 90 
percent of total gross sales.55 This significant contribution to the Indian economy provides 
these groups with substantial influence. MDL is the sole builder for the submarine 
program and has interest in maintaining a continuous building program in order to support 
the technical specialties associated with submarine construction. Upon completion of the 
INS Shankul, the second Indian built submarine, this group lobbied for additional hulls. 
Since this time, the HDW construction license was resurrected and two more subs are 
now under construction. 
The nuclear propulsion program requires very different support because of its high 
cost and technical demands. The capabilities of a nuclear submarine coupled with cruise 
missiles was very appealing to the submarine community and resulted in the lease of the 
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Soviet Charlie-I (renamed INS Chakrd). According to Ashley J. Tellis, the naval 
leadership was interested in purchase of additional Soviet SSGNs of multiple classes, but 
this avenue has since closed. 56 The project to develop an Indian designed nuclear 
powered submarine called the "Advanced Technology Vessel" (ATV) has received 
support at the highest levels of the navy, Defence Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The key challenge 
and the most costly segment of the design is the nuclear reactor.57 The ordeal of one Navy 
Captain proves the existence of factional infighting over the control of the ATV reactor 
design. 
According to an article in Hindu International, CAPT Budhi Kota Subbarao has 
run into resistance from the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) because of his 
involvement as the navy's point man for reactor design. His work alongside BARC began 
in 1976 when the nuclear establishment initiated research and design for a naval reactor.58 
This undertaking began prior to the ATV project and in concert with the navy. CAPT 
Subbarao analyzed three designs from BARC engineers and concluded that they were not 
viable submarine reactors. Under Navy direction, the captain completed two years work 
on his own design, but this was unsatisfactory to BARC as it was design outside of their 
center. Subsequently, Subbarao was removed from the project. Shortly thereafter, the 
captain, now retired, was jailed for a total of twenty months while his case was argued in 
the courts. The unclassified thesis, based on the submarine, which he was carrying was 
used as a premise for prosecution under the Official Secrets Act.  This level of infighting 
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over a project of this size indicates significant control by the primary organization 
involved. 
Factional interests have shaped the development of the submarine fleet since the 
expansion began with the German contract. The conventional factions contained within 
the Navy and shipbuilding industry are primarily concerned with continued building in 
order to prevent deterioration of this segment of the fleet. BARC's influence is aimed at 
control of the reactor design in order to ensure rupees continue flowing into their accounts 
even at the cost of delaying the project, which then raises cost (or revenue depending on 
your point of view). 
3.        Technological momentum 
This argument follows many of the same lines as factional interest. The difference 
is in how the decision to develop or continue a program is arrived at. Technological 
momentum suggests that since the capability exists, the program becomes a natural 
decision without the necessary force from below. For diesel submarines, this would mean 
that the Indian naval leadership funds construction solely because the capacity is available. 
In the case of nuclear development, the national leadership would view this design as the 
natural extension to follow the construction of diesels. There is no evidence of this 
thinking for the construction process. In the area of operations, CDR C. Uday Bhaskar 
states that: "Having a certain level of expertise in submarine operation and maintenance, it 
was only logical that the IN [Indian Navy] kept abreast with technological breakthroughs 
and a nuclear-propelled submarine - a true submersible - was a natural corollary."59 
Lacking a current corollary to the procurement of air independent propulsion (ATP), this 
argument has little backing. 
One unsubstantiated prospect for this argument is that the nuclear weapons 
program was approaching an endpoint in the 1970s. This would cause the nuclear 
establishment to look for new areas to explore.   The professed peaceful intention of the 
59 Bhaskar, "The Indian Navy," 38. 
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Indian nuclear program limited the possibilities, forcing this large corps of engineers 
towards the idea of naval applications. The only evidence remotely linked to this idea is 
the start date for the BARC project prior to beginning the ATV project. 
Technological momentum's influence on the shaping of the submarine fleet is tied 
closely to the scientific bureaucracy. This is produced by a faction pushing for the 
continuation of their work as they reach milestones and look for direction for their efforts. 
Technological progress requires funding for research, which in this case would only come 
through the Ministry of Defence, thus tying the momentum to the group which has the 
influence that much closer. 
4. Institutional Theory - Status, Norms and Identity 
The rhetoric which brings out the indications of a social value being placed on 
submarines begins at the level of the naval force structure and on the value of the strength 
demonstrated by the submarine. "The one factor that has remained constant is the 
equation between major power status and sea-power. European history is replete with 
examples and more recently America, Russia, Japan and China have reiterated this 
tenet."60 The positive side-effects of a plan for naval expansion include the increased 
international attention received as a nation. "The acquisition of a second carrier and lease 
of a nuclear submarine are the catalysts that have caused the ripples. From Washington to 
Canberra, the [Indian Navy] is being projected as a service that is rapidly acquiring a 'blue 
water' capability, whose ultimate aim, it is alleged, is to dominate the Indian Ocean."61 
Attention of this type is of great value to a nation which has remained non-aligned 
and perceives itself as a Third World superpower. One instrument which India has utilized 
to perpetuate international attention has been the submarine, as is proven by the priority 
placed on the ATV program over construction of an aircraft carrier.   Even before the 
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nuclear propulsion program gets running, the combination of proven submarine building at 
MDL and the perception of progress by ATV designers raises the position of India in the 
global structure. No nation still considered a part of the "less developed" group has even 
a conventional submarine construction program, and only five navies operate nuclear 
propelled submarines. "The emergence of the nuclear submarine as the new platform of 
deterrence and the fact that all major, powers (United States, China, France and the United 
Kingdom) are investing in this capability is a reality that cannot be ignored."62 
This evidence, coupled with the lack of sufficient threat to justify the high cost 
alternative of a nuclear platform, indicates a high probability that the status or global value 
associated with a nuclear submarine has shaped the continuation of the ATV project 
during a period of budget constraints and very long delays prior to construction. "India 
evidently wishes to increase its status in the international defense community, and this has 
had a large impact on military budgeting and policy in spite of some significant economic 
constraints."63 For the conventional platform, the existence of alternative explanations 
limits the affect which social value can have on this program, but does not eliminate the 
existence ofthat value. 
D.       CONCLUSION 
Motivations for the development of nuclear or diesel submarines are vastly 
different. The conventional submarine is a cost-effective, potent weapons platform. 
Current threats to India indicate the usefulness of a sub-surface element in naval strategy 
creating the heaviest impact upon shaping the conventional fleet. Security interests have 
been threatened throughout the development of a submarine fleet, thus providing a 
motivating influence for initial acquisitions and modernization. Factional Interests in the 
navy and at MDL support a continued shipbuilding program, but their interests are in step 
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with the national interest such that their impact does not have a negative effect on the 
overall goal of defense. Factional influences were secondary in shaping a conventional 
fleet. The force of prestige on the decision process is present only because submarines are 
a valuable part of any modern navy, but this trend is driven by the military value of this 
platform more than by the social value. All of these influences helped to shape the 
conventional submarine fleet as was expected, but the dominant fact to be considered is 
the threat-based justification. 
On the other hand, the security threat is not far reaching enough to warrant the 
additional cost of a nuclear platform and the associated support facilities. All mission 
scenarios developed by the Indian Navy are suitable to diesel-electric submarines. 
Performance would be enhanced by technical upgrades in weapons and conventional 
propulsion systems, with the only losses as compared to the nuclear sub being top speed 
and endurance. Security interests appear to little influence on nuclear submarine 
development. 
Factional interests have been intimately involved in the motivation behind the naval 
nuclear propulsion program from the beginning. A group such as BARC or DAE had to 
be heavily involved to gain and maintain support for a high-cost project of this type. The 
nuclear establishment began research and development on reactor designs prior to 
government support for the ATV program. This group was motivated through self-serving 
interests as well as their own scientific momentum. The remaining piece of this puzzle is 
the international value added to the Indian Navy by this program. If India is to be 
considered a rational actor, the cost of the program needs to be offset. To complete the 
ATV program would lift India's global clout into the same class as the five nations 
operating SSNs. Therefore after the program began, the social value and impact on Indian 
national identity begin to drive support for nuclear submarine development balancing the 
costs and benefits. 
Looking at the long term threat, economic factors and force capabilities, India will 
likely direct resources into different sectors in the future.  Although, the nuclear program 
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will not be scrapped, it will maintain only slow progress into the twenty-first century. 
Conventional submarine modernization will also be slow until the whole fleet is better 
balanced. Although there are no current contracts reported, air independent propulsion is 
coming over the horizon and could be refitted onto all platforms. 
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III.    PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The economic boom reported in mainland China has drawn attention to the 
military force structure and spending of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The 
declaration of a strategic shift from coastal defense to maritime protection has focused 
much of this interests on the naval component, the People's Liberation Army-Navy 
(PLAN).64 Accompanying this shift is a desire to create the 'blue water' navy required to 
cover China's expanded range of interests. "There can be little doubt that Chinese 
maritime strategy, prompted by increasing offshore economic interests and by the 
dependence of future Chinese economic growth on international trade, now looks 
outwards and not simply to the security of its seaward borders."65 
With China under communist control, the warfighting ideology centered on Mao's 
"People's War" where the man meant more than the weapon. A navy is difficult to fit into 
this philosophy and remained the third priority behind the army and air force. Shortly after 
1950, when PRC leadership began developing the PLAN, force structure was dominated 
by submarines and small surface vessels of limited capability.66 The 1950s witnessed 
China developing the infrastructure necessary to build conventional submarines, and the 
start of the Chinese nuclear submarine program. By 1970, the submarine was the dominant 
platform of the PLAN as seen in Figure 1. The Chinese submarine program peaked in the 
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Figure 1: PLAN Force Structure1 67 
As can be seen in Figure 2, when compared to other major navies the PLAN force 
structure was disproportionately weighted towards submarines from the beginning. In 
addition, other ASW capabilities were neglected. No other major navy has approached a 
ratio of one to one for submarines and surface combatants.68 China has exceeded this ratio 
since 1970 and even exceeded three to one in 1980. This comparative over-emphasis is the 
key to studying Chinese submarine development. 
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Figure 2: Naval Force Structures - 1995 69 
The hypotheses of Chapter I are used to break down the motivations for both the 
nuclear and conventional programs. Project 09, the nuclear submarine design program, 
was conceptualized as the superpowers had just begun to deploy nuclear propulsion. The 
PRC visualized its own potential to compete with the Soviets and Americans. A nuclear 
submarine symbolized this status as described by institutional theory. Project 09 was 
begun by the central government and slowly gained a life of its own. Over time, the 'value' 
of the program outgrew the capabilities which it would bring due to the relative gap 
widening with the major navies of the world. 
Chinese conventional platforms had a similar, but limited symbolic value. The 
submarine was emphasized and built in China not as a means to counter a direct threat, but 
to create a threat for China's neighbors via conventional deterrence. Once the capability to 
build submarines was established, this program was put virtually into auto-pilot for years. 
As the Romeo became outdated and building continued, it is likely that the PLAN did not 
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intend to utilize these platforms in an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role. Lacking the 
complementing surface ASW forces, the Chinese submarine fleet is difficult to justify on 
an ASW basis. The most likely use for the numerous conventional platforms would have 
been to surround and cripple Taiwan's trade links to the outside world, or to act as a layer 
of defense in a war of attrition as described by a "People's War." Only in the nineties has 
the PLAN building program begun to reflect a more balanced nature as demonstrated by 
new surface combatant designs, the negotiations over a small carrier and the rhetoric 
about a 'blue water' navy. With that, submarines are no longer such a dominant portion of 
naval force structure. 
The early development of China's submarines is of primary interest for this study in 
order to draw comparisons to newly developing navies. The age of the information on 
PLAN development, added to the restricted accessibility of early Chinese documents, 
makes the reconstruction of the data very difficult. The historical account of John Lewis 
and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the 
Nuclear Age, is the best source on events during submarine development.70 This study 
relies heavily on the account of Lewis and Xue, but utilizes their work to look at 
submarine development from a new angle. 
A.       DESCRIPTION OF PLAN SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 
Ever since the completion of the Great Wall, the major external threat to China 
came from the sea.71 Naval tradition within China has deep, but thin roots. The fifteenth 
century voyages of Cheng Ho were monumental for the period, but quickly ended with the 
loss of Imperial support. The Chinese Navy temporarily resurfaced in the 1880's with a 
relatively modern fleet, which provided stout resistance in a losing effort during the Sino- 
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Japanese War. Through the turmoil to follow, the Chinese Navy became effectively non- 
existent by the First World War.72 The navy was ignored until the after the Second World 
War. China was able to supplement the navy with surrendered Japanese vessels. 
Under the People's Republic of China, naval developments were greatly affected 
by the political impetus currently underway. The outstanding factor in this development 
has been the continued emphasis upon submarines. It has not been until recent years that 
doctrine has begun to push a balanced fleet concept. Submarines have been 
disproportionate in the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) force structure from the 
beginning as compared to the other navies in the Pacific. 
Prior to the Sino-Soviet split, submarine technology was a large part of the military 
cooperation of the communist allies. China quickly recognized the emphasis being placed 
on submarines by the United States and Soviet Union and turned in this direction. Early 
transfers from the Soviets included the Whiskey class diesel-electric submarine as well as a 
number of smaller submarines. By 1960, Chinese shipyards had successfully constructed a 
Whiskey class SSK from pre-assembled pieces and had moved to independent 
construction. The submarine fleet consisted of twelve Whiskeys with nine additional units 
under construction.73 
The Sino-Soviet split ended cooperation, but the sales contracts continued on a 
minimal basis. The early sixties saw the transfer of four Romeo class conventional 
submarines and one Golf class ballistic missile submarine (SSB). These platforms 
represented a step change in capability for the Chinese. The Romeo was a proven platform 
which the Soviet navy also used to replace its Whiskeys, and the Golf allowed reverse 
engineering of the ballistic missile launch systems for Project 09-2. Chinese naval force 
structure was dominated by the submarine. Surface ship designs emphasized escorts with 
extremely limited ASW assets. The rationale behind this mixture was based upon Taiwan 
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as the primary threat. The submarine fleet was intended as a blockading force with little 
concern for other submarines. 
The Chinese leadership was not satisfied with operating only conventional 
submarines. Sino-Soviet negotiations over the transfer of nuclear technology remained 
unresolved. The Soviets offered the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet submarine flotilla 
based from the Chinese coastline, but this did not satisfy the Chinese desire for a modern 
submarine fleet. Project 09, the Chinese nuclear submarine design project, began in 1958 
to develop an indigenous nuclear submarine. The main characteristic of Project 09 was 
that it undertook all aspects of design simultaneously, from the propulsion plant to hull 
and weapons designs. The intent was to develop a nuclear powered submarine and 
immediately revise that platform for a ballistic missile submarine. 74 This had not been 
accomplished by either the United States or Soviet Union. 
The Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Biao were large setbacks to the 
research and design programs of the PLAN. In contrast to other military programs, 
Project 09 sat on the side with reduced manpower, but slowly continued its progress. 
Through all of the political and economic turmoil, submarines kept being produced, if only 
at a low rate. The remainder of the navy did not recover until the mid-1980's.75 
After the delays caused by politics and design flaws, the PLAN conducted the 
initial sea trials for the first Han class nuclear powered submarine in 1974. The second unit 
was completed in 1977 and has been followed by three others. At an extreme cost, China 
fulfilled a twenty year desire to join another form of the "nuclear club"76 The ballistic 
missile submarine program, Project 09-2, emerged separate from the original project in 
1967. Considering the amount of duplication between designs, the final addition of the Xia 
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class SSBN to the fleet in 1983 seems quite slow. The follow-on submarines of this class 
were delayed and suspended as Deng Xiaoping shifted budgetary emphasis from the 
military to commercial modernization.77 It has been reported that the second Xia SSBN 
was launched in 1982, but unconfirmed reports show the loss of one in 1985.78 Project 09- 
3, the follow-on SSBN design, is in development. 
The conventional submarine program was not setback as significantly as the more 
expensive nuclear program through the political turmoil. Chinese shipyards pumped out 
Romeo class submarines at a rate of six platforms per year. The inventory topped out at 
over 100 submarines in the late eighties. The problem with this program was that the 
design was rarely updated, making the fleet ineffective in the late cold war undersea 
environment. However, if U.S. and Soviet submarines are neglected, the sheer numerical 
superiority of the Chinese submarines made them a formidable threat to anyone within 
their limited range. In the eighties, even half of the Romeos might have been effective in 
blockading Taiwan prior to possible U.S. intervention. In an attempt to upgrade the 
conventional submarine fleet, Chinese designers built the Ming class submarine. Early 
problems kept production low, but as these obstacles fell to the wayside, a limited number 
of Mings became available to support the Han in the longer range missions. The PRC 
returned to its old supplier in 1995 for a purchase of four Kilo class submarines. The most 
important implication of a Kilo purchase is the transfer of advanced technology, ranging 
from anachoic coating and sound silencing techniques to possible fuel cell ATP.79 
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Even with the continued emphasis on submarines, the PLAN lacks any capability 
of carrying out an ASW mission. The Romeo submarine's sensor systems are short range 
active systems lacking the data processing needed to gain passive acoustic detection. The 
Han SSNs are too noisy to be effective ASW platforms without additional assistance. The 
Ming class SSK might be an adequate ASW platform, but they are limited in numbers. The 
Luda class destroyers, the most common platform in the surface fleet, have negligible 
ASW capabilities and are easy targets for modern submarines. Only the newest Chinese 
destroyers, the Zhangjiang, are suited to this mission. The PLAN recognizes the 
deficiencies in its force structure and has begun working to correct this problem. "The 
development of the PLAN appears to be planned in three phases spread over a period of 
thirty plus years."80 The 1987 declaration of a desire to develop "blue water" capabilities 
stems from China's perceived role for itself in Asia and recognition of expanding maritime 
interests. Naval expansion is aimed at adding the balance needed in the force structure, 
including ASW platforms, but the growth of the PLAN is dependent on the economic 
growth in the PRC. 
B.        TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
1.        National Security - Threat Based 
The PLAN was the smallest segment of the PLA and overshadowed by the 
ideology of Mao and the "People's War." With the recognition of the impact of high 
technology weapons systems, the navy and submarines are gaining greater influence. The 
Chinese coastline extends 14,500 kilometers from the Korean Peninsula to Vietnam. The 
twelve major ports are active with 165 billion dollars of imports and exports. The addition 
of Hong Kong in 1997 will boost this number significantly. The Exclusive Economic Zone 
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(EEZ) of China covers three million square kilometers and encompasses disputes with 
Asian neighbors from Japan to Indonesia. The maritime territories of China, particularly 
the South China Sea, cover major trade routes for much of the world. 
During the cold war, Soviets and Americans frequently operated all around Asia. 
Today, the U.S. Navy is the primary naval presence, but with the lack of a cold war, many 
smaller navies appear willing to stand up for their own interests within the region. The 
dispute surrounding the Spratly Islands is a primary example. Although China is not 
directly threatened from the sea, tension with the United States and other nations are 
driving the PRC to reconsider its maritime position. 
Chinese sources indicating perception of threat are vague at best. I draw upon 
other sources and non-naval events to postulate the threats. The lack of published threat 
perceptions is not an indication of Chinese contentment with the world, but more likely an 
indication of this topic not being available to open sources. The perceived naval threats to 
the PRC range from the United States, due to shear capability differences, to the small 
navies attempting to protect their own interests in the South China Sea. These perceived 
threats include any navies considered to impact upon Chinese interests, particularly those 
interests within territorial waters. The PLAN build-up is focused on creating parity with 
India and Japan for the short term and with becoming a world power in the next thirty 
years. 
a.        United States and Russia 
The United States Navy is perceived as a threat to the PLAN solely due to 
its ability and history for exerting its influence in the region. This situation is not expected 
to change unless U.S. interests change in the region. Lacking any formidable ASW 
defenses, U.S. submarines would have the freedom to operate at will in Chinese waters. 
Stephen Ryan quotes one naval analyst that "one U.S. attack submarine would deter any 
Chinese military venture."81   This is a broad statement but when concerned solely with 
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naval ventures, a U.S. submarine would hold a significant capability advantage against 
PLAN forces. 
Russian capabilities, though currently backed by rapidly declining budgets, 
present a similar picture to the Chinese without the ocean in between. The vast borders of 
these nations provide for many disputes. Except for the Korean Peninsula, there would be 
nothing separating the maritime territories. The historical relationship of the PRC and 
USSR has been tense since 1960. When Sino-American relations improved, the Chinese 
were even willing to ask for U.S. guarantees against Soviet nuclear aggression. 
The tensions between all three nations are slowly releasing. However, even 
though the United States and Russia have agreed to end the targeting of the other's cities 
by nuclear weapons, this same assurance has not been extended to the mainland of China. 
In conjunction with the difference in the number of warheads available to the United 
States or Russia, the PRC remains in a position justifying the continued push for a 
survivable strategic platform. 
b.        Japan and India 
Japan and India have the navies most comparable to the PLAN. "While 
Beijing does not yet feel threatened, it is nevertheless worried by the trends."82 In the case 
of Japan, the PRC sees a historical adversary which has a significant technological 
advantage and an economy capable of backing it up. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense 
Force (JMSDF) has more destroyers and frigates than either China or India. The strategic 
posture of the JMSDF has been extended out to one thousand nautical miles, well beyond 
the territorial area of an EEZ. A primary indicator of the Chinese perception of a threat 
from the North is the concentration of PLAN forces in the Northern fleet, including 
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China's nuclear attack submarines, while the most recent confrontations with other navies 
have been in the South China Sea. 
As described in Chapter II, the Indian Navy is openly building its own naval 
force structure in an effort to develop blue water capabilities including new aircraft 
carriers and other power projection platforms. India is also stating the desire to prevent 
the reach of the PLAN into the Indian Ocean region and has attempted to assert its own 
influence in Southeast Asia. The financial aid provided to Burma by the Chinese for naval 
facilities in the Bay of Bengal indicates a future desire to operate in this area. China has 
also begun deployments to this area to foster naval contacts and test new logistics assets.83 
c. Southeast Asia 
The South China Sea is the primary area of new concern for the PLAN. 
With a new emphasis on maritime vice coastal defense, the PLAN faces many small navies 
also attempting to protect their own perceived interests in the area. Vietnam and China 
engaged in naval conflicts over the Paracel Islands in 1974 and again over the Spratly 
chain in 1988 when three Vietnamese vessels were sunk. The Philippines, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Indonesia also claim sovereignty over various islands of these chains. If not 
for the expectations of great resource wealth, this area would likely be just an arena for 
flexing muscle.84 
d. Taiwan and Korea 
Taiwan is considered a threat by the PRC in both military terms and in 
political terms. As a policy position, Beijing has lobbied against military acquisitions by 
Taiwan and has been successful in blocking the purchase of additional submarines from the 
Dutch. Politically, the PRC leadership has forced themselves to plan for an improbable 
military action against Taiwan in the case of a claim of independence. The PRC considers 
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the issues surrounding Taiwan to be internal domestic issues, but they have impacted the 
shaping of PLAN forces and operations. 
North Korea was provided assistance by the Chinese in order to establish 
submarine building capacity. The North Korean fleet could be characterized as a smaller 
version of the PLAN with thirty-five Romeo class submarines plus a small surface fleet. 
One unique addition is the midget submarines operated by North Korea. South Korea is 
beginning to expand its own fleet with the indigenous construction of submarines. As this 
fleet grows it will cause similar concerns to the PLAN as the JMSDF does today. 
The PLAN remains a threat only to its neighbors. Current strategies have 
expanded to accompany the increase in capabilities, but nonetheless this force would be 
incapable of standing up to even the JMSDF. India might be a fair fight, depending on the 
location and logistical support. The PLAN would still need to depend on numerical 
superiority in order to exert its force against the smaller navies which it must share the 
waters with in the southern territories. 
e.        Analysis 
Assuming that China's desire is to hold a position of regional importance, 
but not in a hegemonic role. China has not been threatened from the sea since the Japanese 
invasions of the "Undeclared War" of 1937-39. China's limited naval conflicts of this half 
of the century have been with the minor navies of the region such as Vietnam. 
The submarine threat to China has been limited for years. U.S. and Soviet 
submarine operations focused on cold war missions. Japan's submarines were limited by 
constitutional interpretations and the U.S.-Japan security agreement, but it cannot be 
assumed that China considered this to eliminate any possible threat. India's submarines 
were unable to reach into Chinese waters and the other regional submarines lacked the 
capability to impact Chinese interests. However, this is all changing. 
Under the above circumstances, a threat based argument is difficult to 
justify without assuming China to perceive capability as threat. A coastal defense mission, 
and even a blockade of Taiwan, could have been accomplished equally as well by other 
54 
types of platforms. As ASW platforms, the Romeo and Han classes needed additional 
emphasis on sensor packages. The apparent lack of ASW doctrine leads to the conclusion 
that the conventional submarines were intended for an offensive purpose. This possibility 
is consistent with the advantage provided by the operating areas along the Chinese coast if 
the PLAN evaluated this factor. The national security hypothesis is difficult to validate in 
the past. Early submarine development appears to be shaped in order to create a threat, 
possibly in terms of a conventional deterrent. 
In the past decade, the undersea emphasis has shifted, to a more defensive 
nature. The newest Chinese surface vessels are a step improvement in ASW capability. 
The submarine program has begun to look beyond the early sonars provided by the 
Soviets, including the installation of the French DUUX-5 in the newer submarines. The 
purchase of the Kilos from Russia also supports a desire to increase the reach of China's 
submarines while gaining more effective ASW hulls. Overall, the Chinese conventional 
submarine fleet is better justified today on a threat basis than in the past. 
The question of the motivation for the nuclear submarines goes directly to 
the professed missions of the PLAN. The coastal defense posture and now the maritime 
territorial stance do not require the extended range or endurance of a nuclear platform. 
Even within the two hundred nautical mile boundary of the EEZ, a conventional submarine 
is sufficient to provide for effective patrolling. Thus, the development of nuclear power 
requires additional motivations beyond this hypothesis. 
2.        Factional Interests 
The organizational structure within the PRC's government is formulated on the 
basis of creating a general reporting chain going from the peak of the central government 
down to specialized areas of expertise. The nuclear submarine design project, Project 09, 
was integrated heavily into this structure. Project 09 operated under the First Ministry for 
Machine Building which reported to the Defense Science and Technology Commission. 
The only level above this was the Central Military Commission (CMC). The key figure in 
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the top two levels was Nie Rongzhen, a leader in weapons research and design. Nie's 
primary goal was the development of a nuclear powered missile submarine. His primary 
model for organizational structure was the U.S. Navy's Special Projects Office, which 
handled the Polaris program.85 
Some of the early difficulties experienced were the result of Project 09 being an 
isolated organization rather than becoming integrated into the national infrastructure. 
During the 1950s, Soviet industrial assistance was considered dependable. Chinese 
emphasis was placed on production facilities which utilized Soviet heavy machinery. 
China's major industries were unable to support the special needs of Project 09. The 
Sino-Soviet split caused setbacks in the nuclear programs due to the need to develop the 
industrial support network, and created economic difficulties for all China. 
During early program development, factional battles for control frequently altered 
the direction of submarine development. The National Defense Industrial Commission 
placed its priority on the modernization of conventional forces over the strategic forces, 
but Nie Rongzhen was able to rally the support of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao for the 
continuation of Project 09. One year later in November 1962, the top leadership of the 
PRC reversed course and scaled back funding to the nuclear submarine program to a level 
where only a small core of experts could continue. The remaining efforts were focused on 
the reactor design. When Project 09 was later restored to scale, the organization was 
controlled within the regular channels of the military industrial system. This new core 
would be the reason the program survived the coming political turmoil. 
The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had different impacts on 
Project 09. The isolation of this program saved it from the mass movements of the Great 
Leap, but not the Cultural Revolution which reduced it to a point where "gains were 
minimal and fragmentary." Following his death in 1976, Lin Biao's ties to the Defense 
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Science and Technology Commission caused great scrutiny and further delays for the 
program.87 
For the nuclear submarine program, factional interests were different than those 
seen in India. Factionalism was in the form of competing leaders vice an organization 
pushing a program. Control of Project 09 shifted between the National Defense Industry 
Organization, Defense Science and Technology Commission and the Project Leading 
Group, based on who was in favor with party leadership. Power politics played a large 
role in the delays for Project 09. The bottom line decisions clearly remained at the peak of 
the government while the organization which advised and carried out these orders shifted 
frequently. In the end, the successful completion of the nuclear submarine program can be 
attributed to the close personal attention of Zhou Enlai to ensure the program held 
support through the many troubles encountered during the lengthy sea trials. Zhou 
recognized the need to remove politics from the development program.88 Factional 
interests     were     limited     in    the     drive    to     completion     for     Project     09. 
The conventional submarine program was much less impacted by political turmoil. 
In the spring of 1960, with the Sino-Soviet split developing, the CMC placed an emphasis 
on the building the Romeo and Golf submarines. The designs and equipment for these 
programs were provided in the Soviet's final attempt to slow or close the rift. China was 
then able to funnel heavy resources into the three primary shipyards in a move for self- 
reliance. Once the submarine building capacity was established, it was left alone to operate 
to it budgetary capacity. There was limited interaction with the nuclear projects except to 
develop the submarine launched missile. There is limited indication of an organizational 
lobby to promote conventional submarines, yet they continued to roll off the assembly line. 
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3. Technological Momentum 
The technological momentum hypothesis is not born out by the Chinese case 
study. Submarine development began from scratch with Soviet assistance while the PLAN 
was in its infancy. Lacking a tradition or the technological base for submarine 
construction, China embarked upon projects to level itself with the major navies of the 
world. The style of the development also goes against this hypothesis. Rather than taking 
the first step to developing submarines and allowing the program to grow from a base, 
China made a 'great leap' and attempted to go straight to the final product. It is 
impossible to accurately evaluate whether this method resulted in an overall reduction or 
delay in design time, but it does make the momentum explanation improbable. 
The only possible application for technological momentum is in the construction of 
over one hundred Romeo class conventional submarines. Once the process began, the only 
restriction was budgetary. Production rates sometimes topped six hulls per year. The 
improvement of this class was limited. The momentum which carried this program was 
bureaucratic in nature rather than technological. The program did not require a factional 
type of influence. Momentum could be maintained by staying with the status quo The 
Ming class submarine was designed to succeed the Romeo. Design flaws caused the 
conventional submarine program to fall back on the less capable but proven platform until 
improvements could be made. 
4. Institutional Theory - Status, Norms and Identity 
Mao Zedong outwardly stated his goal in the early development of the PRC to be 
to "catch up with Great Britain" and then to go beyond this. Mao had grandiose visions 
for China's place in the world. While his ideology called for a "People's War," he also 
called for the development of "what others have" and the creation of a "small but all 
inclusive arsenal." In the years preceding the Sino-Soviet split, China lobbied heavily for 
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design assistance for a nuclear submarine. When the last hopes for this desire faded, Mao 
stated, "We will have to build nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years!"89 
These attitudes lay the foundation for an institutional argument. The added proof 
for the symbolic nature of a submarine comes from the lack of surrounding infrastructure. 
When the nuclear submarine program was authorized in August 1958, the defining 
documents lacked a purpose or sense of mission for the prospective design. The general 
thrust was to lay out the technical requirements with limited justification. As the project 
developed, it lacked the strategic doctrine to support and shape the design or provide a 
coherent direction. This allowed the political influence to dominate program control. 
"In the 1950s and 1960s, revolutionary idealism and patriotism brought the 
nation's best minds to the strategic weapons programs, and Project 09 was a beneficiary. 
After the mid-1980s, personal gain and opportunism began to replace idealism and 
patriotism."90 The current leadership views economic success to be necessary before the 
military. 
Another indicator of the submarines place in the Chinese priorities was its 
dominance of naval force structure with no complementing forces. The mission of the 
PLAN remained coastal in nature with the submarine as the only platform capable of going 
beyond a coastal reach. Until recent years, the overt desire to go beyond coastal defense 
was non-existent or suppressed, and the development of other ships to raise the 
capabilities of the PLAN was limited. 
The nuclear submarine, particularly the SSBN, provided a symbol of modernity to 
the PLAN and China. The launching of these platforms provided a great deal of 
international interest. Now that the capacity has been proven, Chinese leaders have begun 
to emphasize other avenues. The 1991 Gulf War proved the impact of high technology 
89
 Ibid., 18. 
90 Ibid., 102. 
59 
weapons and China has now placed top priority on these projects for force modernization. 
The follow-on nuclear submarine projects have been lowered in priority even though the 
platforms currently in operation still have many problems. 
The institutional value of the nuclear submarine faded as the capacity to complete 
the project became reality. The PLAN has refocused on the need for a credible ocean- 
going force, but this will take time to develop. A three stage development program will 
overhaul the military and step it through the level of a semi-developed nation prior to 
reaching the PRC's goal to be a leading world power in military respects. The submarine 
program is already well down this path with the rest of the PLAN decades behind. The 
reduction of priority for Project 09 does not indicate a Chinese rejection of the 
international norms associated with submarines, but rather a recognition of how the 
nuclear submarine's "value" can be further enhanced by being a component of a balanced 
fleet. A "blue water" navy has become a new avenue to achieving the international identity 
which it previously pursued through nuclear submarines. Much like the nuclear submarine 
was a "must" for the PRC, the expanding PLAN may fill this role today. Individual high- 
tech platforms cannot provide the same level of "value" within the global structure 
without fitting into a comp[rehensive package, in this case a "blue water" navy. 
C.       CONCLUSION 
The motivations behind submarine development in China are varied between 
nuclear and conventional platforms. The conventional submarine program is best explained 
through the national security hypothesis, but for different reasons than seen in the Indian 
case study. China lacked any significant ASW threat other than the superpowers and these 
forces were generally occupied tracking each other. However, assuming that China 
perceived a threat from U.S. and Soviet submarines, the lack of conventional design 
upgrade programs limits the use of this explanation. Looking at the issue from a different 
angle, building the large fleet of Romeo class submarines was a means through which to 
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create an ASW threat for China's neighbors. This fleet could then provide for national 
security in other than a purely defensive role. 
Other hypotheses carry less weight for conventional developments. Factional 
interests do not appear to be evident in building conventional submarines. Bureaucratic 
momentum is plausible when considering the continuity of the building but not for the 
initial momentum. The conventional submarines were overshadowed by the nuclear 
submarine program limiting their 'value' to the state. 
Project 09 began early in the development of the PLAN. The United States and 
Soviet Union were deploying nuclear submarines. China required a program to attempt to 
counter this emerging threat. This could be a very simple argument, but China pursued 
only one option, nuclear submarines. Without the accompanying doctrine beyond coastal 
defense or the complementing forces to carry out ASW, the undersea threat falls short of 
justifying Chinese nuclear submarine development. The strategy employed by the PLAN 
required limited reach, well within the means of a capable conventional force. 
Factional interests had significant impact on Project 09, but the form of this impact 
was detrimental to progress. Political power struggles constantly shifted organizational 
control and caused delays. After Project 09 was placed under the military structure, the 
program placed on an even keel and factional interests became less influential. 
Technological momentum could never have existed as there was no base from which to 
begin and the difficulties encountered could have easily shut down development. 
Institutional theory and the creation of "norms" placing "value" upon a system 
begins to fill this gap. The PRC leadership viewed the nuclear submarine in this manner. 
With the Soviet refusal for assistance, Project 09 began as a drive for self-reliance and as a 
means to close the gap with the emerging superpowers. The lower priority now placed on 
follow-on nuclear submarine designs also leads me to the institutional argument as a 
motivation for initial development. With the capability established, further designs will 
provide less attention in the international system. The new focus on a "blue water" navy 
has redirected that attention to keep China in the forefront. As the PLAN modernizes and 
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fills in the gaps in its force structure, there may again be an emphasis on the submarine 
programs, both nuclear and conventional. 
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IV.     JAPAN 
A case study of Japanese submarine development differs from the previous studies 
of India and China in that Japan began the process with an existing submarine tradition 
and the experience which accompanies that tradition. This study is limited by the lack of 
naval nuclear propulsion developments to provide comparison with conventional 
submarines. The remainder of the study's design is similar to the previous chapters. 
Japan had developed one of the world's leading navies entering the Second World 
War. Japan integrated submarines into its strategy as a means of creating layers of defense 
to hinder the advance of the U. S. Navy. Throughout the war, the Japanese rules of 
engagement restricted the operations of its submarines by giving low priority to merchants 
as targets of opportunity and focusing on naval engagements. The defeat of Japan changed 
the status of the Imperial Navy forever. At the end of 1945, over 125 submarines had been 
lost and the remainder of the Japanese fleet had been sunk, scrapped or surrendered. The 
U.S. and British fleets used these units for target practice and weapons testing. The 
Chinese and Russians added them to their fleets. The outcome of the Second World War 
set the framework under which Japan would later rebuild a submarine fleet.91 
Established in 1947, Article Nine of the Japanese constitution has been debated 
since its creation and remains a sensitive topic for both Japanese and Americans. The 
original intention was to restrain the re-emergence of Japan as a military power. 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
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air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.92 
The emergence of the cold war forced the United States to rethink its position on the 
strength of Japan. During the confusion of the first weeks of the Korean War, the U.S. 
Occupation forces decided to organize the National Police Force to preserve peace within 
Japan. The name was changed in 1952 to the National Safety Force, and again in 1954 to 
the Self-Defense Forces.93 Some interpretations of article nine would prohibit any type of 
military forces, however the predominant viewpoint recognized the need for a defense 
capability. Within evolving interpretations, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
(JMSDF) has grown under Article Nine's restrictions into one of the world's most modern 
naval forces. JMSDF force structure has been created to protect Japanese interests in the 
surrounding waters, but in a form unlike any coastal navy. Agreements with the United 
States have extended the JMSDF range out to a one thousand nautical mile radius around 
the Japanese islands, emphasizing anti-submarine warfare and escort capabilities.94 The 
acquisition of power projection vessels is still restricted. Today, the JMSDF is a well 
balanced fleet with submarines representing over twenty percent of current forces. 
A.        RESTORATION OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 
Under constitutional restrictions, naval development needed to respond to 
objective threats in order to justify defensive expenditures. The ASW mission fit this role 
very well. The destroyers built as a part of the first five year plan were split between ASW 
vessels and escorts. In 1960, the Oyashio diesel-electric submarine was the first submarine 
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built in Japan since the war.95 These early developments indicate an intention to go beyond 
coastal defense and to cover the emerging ASW threat in the region represented by the 
Soviet Union. 
Submarine design and construction continued on a steady basis through the sixties. 
Nine new submarines of two new designs were built. Four Hayashio submarines expanded 
upon the previous design to improve seaworthiness and propulsion. Five submarines of the 
Ooshio class then followed with new improvements in sonar and electronics. The surface 
fleet followed suit with additional ASW designs maintaining a modern, balanced ASW 
force.96 
Before the Hayashio and Oyashio submarines could reach twenty years old, they 
were mothballed and replaced by new designs. The continuity of the design and 
construction programs produced an additional two submarine classes in the next decade. 
Seven hulls of the Uzushio class were completed, of which two remain in service today. 
This design was the first Japanese submarine to use a double hull for added strength and a 
teardrop shape for lower hydrodynamic resistance. Between 1976 and 1980, this class was 
enlarged and designated the Yuushio class submarine. The Yuushio incorporated a towed 
array sonar and was the deepest diving design to date. By 1980, Japan's ASW forces, 
combining submarines and ASW destroyers comprised over half of the Japanese Maritime 
Self-Defense Force. 
After 1987, Japan produced its sixth and seventh new designs in under thirty years. 
The Harushio represented improved noise reduction, towed sonars, and wireless aerials, 
as well as anachoic coating. Five hulls of this class are complete and two additional are 
under construction. The improved version of the Harushio is also under construction 
which will incorporate a large flank sonar array. Later hulls of this class are expected to be 
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equipped with Sterling engine AIP, which is being tested by the Technical Research and 
Development Institute.97 
The current JMSDF is one of the world's most modern navies. In terms of 
submarines, the Japanese match well in capabilities against the primary conventional 
designs sailing today's oceans. Some of the electronics packages may even be superior to 
the world's top export products, but cannot be compared as they cannot leave Japanese 
hands.98 Japanese success in design and production of submarines can be attributed to the 
continuity of the building program. For over two decades, ship-builders have produced a 
minimum of one platform per year. The designs have been upgraded seven times since the 
restoration of building in 1960. The program's overall intent is to maintain this production 
pace and retire older platforms after only sixteen years of service. This process keeps 
maintenance costs low by preventing the need for major overhauls and upgrades, while 
sustaining continuous modernization. The only setback is the damage to construction 
facilities from the Kobe earthquake in 1995 which may slow construction and require 
older hulls to be maintained beyond the planned decommissioning.99 The possible 
expansion of the submarine fleet would likely only occur with redefined mission 
parameters and a total naval expansion. This possibility will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
A nuclear submarine program was considered by Japan in the early days of the 
cold war. On 5 May 1959, the Director of the Japanese Defense Agency confirmed early 
studies on the possibility of a nuclear propulsion program.100 Possible explanations for the 
nuclear program not being developed include its high cost, constitutional restrictions and 
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the ability of the conventional fleet to adequately cover areas patrolled by the JMSDF. 
Another possible impact on the decision not to proceed with a nuclear program may have 
been signals from U.S. sources indicating that nuclear propulsion was not needed by Japan 
and that U.S. assets would be available if the requirement arose.101 
B.        TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
1.        National Security - Threat Based 
The missions of the JMSDF are restricted by the Japanese constitution in order to 
maintain a defensive posture. Japanese economic success has created a vast range of 
interests for Japan. "The prosperity of Japan is therefore dependent on the security of her 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) with the United States, with Australasia and South- 
East Asia, with the Indian subcontinent and Europe, and with the oil-producing countries 
of the Gulf."102 
The JMSDF is divided into four escort flotillas and five district flotillas plus two 
submarine flotillas. Coastal defense is the responsibility of the districts centered around 
five major naval bases. Coastal forces must protect over twenty-nine thousand kilometers 
of coastline and twenty-one major ports.103 One characteristic that separates the JMSDF 
from other small or medium navies is the lack of fast attack craft and patrol boats. The 
coastal defense mission is carried out by the larger platforms at a greater distance from 
shore.104 
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The reach of the submarine and escort flotillas extends well beyond the standard 
EEZ out to a one thousand nautical mile radius in accordance with the Japan-U.S. 
communique. In May 1981, President Reagan and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed to the 
increased defense responsibilities "in Japanese territories and its surrounding air and sea 
space."105 This range encompasses Russian strategic access points to the Pacific and 
extends southward to Taiwan. Beyond these limits, Japan relies upon the U.S. Navy to 
protect its overseas interests. 
Japan's National Defense Program Outline prescribes the requirements which the 
JMSDF must fulfill. One fleet escort force must be available as a rapid response unit. A 
surface anti-submarine force of one ship division must be operationally ready in each naval 
district. Submarines, anti-submarine helicopters and fixed wing units, and mine-sweepers 
must be maintained for surveillance and defensive missions around Japanese ports and 
major straits.106 
For this study, Japan's perception of maritime threat is assumed to stop at the one 
thousand mile marker, though obviously Japan's perceptions do not have a mileage limit. 
The threat within this radius is considered to be primary in shaping Japan's naval force 
structure. The perceived threats of Japan are similar to the regional concerns of the United 
States, but for different reasons. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) publishes Defense 
of Japan each year laying out the general strategic plans of the JDA.107 As the cold war 
subsided, regional changes have impacted this document, but the primary nations being 
watched remain the same: Russia, China and North Korea. 
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The history of the cold war and the proximity of the large Russian naval 
base at Vladivostock have shaped the perceptions of Japan. Whether the Soviets were an 
overt threat or one imposed by the United States, Japan accepted it and planned based on 
that premise. The Soviet Navy was not only larger in total numbers, but operated the 
largest submarine fleet in the Pacific including up to thirty ballistic missile submarines and 
ninety attack submarines. The geo-strategic position of Japan, around Russian access to 
the Pacific, placed these navies in position to have frequent contact with the other. Soviet 
naval and air activity in the Pacific has typically encircled the Japanese islands, and since 
1978, Soviet troops have been positioned in the disputed Northern territories.108 
Even though the official line stated that the Soviet Union was only a 
potential threat and an invasion was unlikely, Japan could not ignore the Soviet armaments 
in Eastern Asia. Today's political instability in Russia lessens the threat to Japan further 
but relations are still strained particularly while these nations remain in dispute over the 
Kuril islands seized by the Soviet Union in 1945.109 For Japan, the Russian fleet cannot be 
disregarded, because as it declines in size, its quality is being upgraded.110 
b. China 
The cultural ties between Japan and the Chinese mainland have not 
prevented an historical animosity between these nations. Both countries desire to be the 
preeminent power in Northeast Asia creating tension and suspicion on both sides. 
Throughout the cold war, China was considered to be pre-occupied with the Soviets, thus 
minimizing the potential threat.111 China's current growth and naval build-up are a concern 
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for Japan. While the probability of a direct conflict is not high, conflicting Japanese and 
Chinese interests are likely to lead to confrontation. The PLAN would likely think twice 
about directly facing a technologically superior JMSDF. However, the resurgence of 
Chinese naval action in support of Chinese claims elsewhere could indirectly conflict with 
Japanese interests. Because the restrictions of the U.S.-Japan security agreement prevent 
JMSDF involvement beyond one thousand nautical miles, Japan must depend on the U.S. 
Navy to protect its interests. The relations between the United States and PRC then 
become a factor in Japanese security interests. 
c. Korea 
One other historical adversary for Japan has not yet been mentioned, North 
Korea. Japanese relations with North Korea are less than confrontational, but the military 
capabilities of North Korea are only suited to strike two possible areas, South Korea or 
Japan. The situation on the Korean peninsula has had limited impact on the make-up of the 
JMSDF, but would need to have been factored into Japanese strategic planning. Even the 
possibility of a conflict between the two Koreas would have feedback into the Japanese 
system due to links to the United States and hence South Korea. The 1994 tensions over 
North Korean nuclear weapons production caused Japan to consider how its forces would 
be involved if a conflict occurred on the peninsula.112 With the possibility of Korean 
unification, Japan would be forced to rethink its position considering the resulting U.S. 
involvement on a unified peninsula. Outside of the U.S. presence in East Asia, Japan has 
historically perceived Korea as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." 
d. United States 
Past JMSDF development does not use the United States as a threat, but 
rather as a model due to close security ties. If the U.S.-Japan security arrangement breaks 
down, the perceptions of Japanese planners would change. A U.S. withdrawal from East 
Asia would require Japan to reevaluate the missions of the JMSDF. Japanese forces would 
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be stretched thin in order to fully cover Japan's global interests, and the economy heavily 
burdened until force structure expansion could be completed. One key to extending the 
reach of the submarine fleet would be the transition to a nuclear powered submarine. The 
technical base to make this leap currently exists in Japan.113 
e. Analysis 
The size and capability of the Soviet submarine fleet forced Japan to take 
heed of the undersea threat with or without U.S. protection. U.S. submarines were not 
quantitatively sufficient to maintain a steady surveillance of the waters around Japan. 
Based solely on the Soviet submarine threat, the reemergence of Japanese submarine 
development can be justified. China and North Korea may have been more overt threats, 
based on intentions, but the military capacity to directly impact Japan has been limited in 
both cases. The submarine fleets of China and North Korea lacked the sophistication to 
keep up with the modernizing Japanese submarines. Only the numerical superiority of the 
Chinese Romeos could possibly overcome the technologically superior JMSDF ASW 
forces. 
Japan's place along side the United States in the cold war provides 
justification for the type of development for a submarine fleet. As economic interests 
gained importance, the Soviet threat was relatively diminished, but the U.S. Navy still had 
to be relied upon outside Northeast Asia. The restrictions of the constitution and security 
agreement inhibited the restoration of a fleet comparable in size to the pre-war fleet. 
Within these restrictions, the diesel submarine program with a fleet of eighteen hulls and a 
continuous building program, provides solid coverage of Japanese waters without being 
constrained by maintenance cycles. The result is one the world's top submarine fleets. As 
the relationship with the United States changes, the economic interests will gain in relative 
influence over submarine developments. 
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2.        Factional Interests 
At the heart of the Japanese decision making system lies factionalism. There are 
volumes describing the factions controlling the political system and how the real power 
base is actually at a level behind the elected leadership. The question for this study is 
whether the factional power behind the general decision making has also shaped the 
development of military force planning and the submarine construction program. 
The political arena in Japan is characterized by quick turnovers. The average time 
that a Prime Minister spends in office is about two years. The cabinet ministers hold their 
positions for an average of one year, allowing them time to do little more than institute 
general policies. The Defense Agency is a part of this group, but with notably less power 
than its counterparts in the cabinet.114 Thus, the attitudes and biases of the political 
leadership have a much larger impact upon defense issues. Throughout the constant 
turnovers, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has remained the party in power. 
Therefore, the changes which did occur were minor compared to the possibilities if 
opposing parties repeatedly traded control.115 
One notable characteristic of Japanese society alters the dynamics of a system 
permeated by factionalism. Hierarchy and consensus building play important roles in 
Japanese decision making. "While there may be policy conflicts between subdivisions or 
factional groups within a ministry, each ministry develops its own policies on controversial 
issues and fights for these in competition with other ministries and even with the party in 
power."116 Consensus building may lead to a compromise, but the hierarchy will determine 
who holds the power over the final outcome. 
The two largest influence groups outside of politics are public opinion and big 
business. Public opinion runs from nationalistic to pacifistic in the debate over the legality 
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of self-defense forces. In general, the impact of public opinion on the military has been to 
slow force structure growth. Industry is also a powerful force within Japan, but when 
related to defense, the export restrictions and budgetary limits restrain the profitability of 
defense industry. Therefore, it is unlikely that this faction has had significant impact on the 
submarine program in the past. 
One last faction, by a stretch of the definition, would be the United States, 
represented by the pressure placed upon Japan over security issues. This is one faction 
which would positively push for submarine developments in an effort to improve the U.S. 
position. "Japanese defense policy has been designed more to manage conflicting U.S. and 
domestic pressures than to relate to the international balance of forces."117 Although for 
different reasons, the resulting submarine fleet met a portion of U.S. desires and fit 
Japanese security needs. Thus, factional interests have been a consistent influence 
throughout fleet development, but can only be considered an underlying factor for 
submarine development. 
3.        Technological Momentum 
The technological momentum argument may tell a part of the story for the 
conventional submarine development in Japan. The building process reemerged from a 
dormant program whose origins predate the Second World War. The evolution of the 
Japanese submarine through seven designs in thirty years creates a possible link to the 
overall technological development of the Japanese economy, but does not appear to be an 
overwhelming impetus. 
The likely scenario ties the economic development to design improvements 
through industrial evolution. As the Japanese economy evolved through the industrial and 
into high technology, these advances translated into improvements in submarine and 
system design upgrades. In reverse of trends elsewhere, civilian technologies were turned 
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around for dual use in military equipment.118 The strength of the economy and the 
planning of the JMSDF allowed it to maintain a continuous construction program which 
could incorporate design modernization. This hypothesis has the ability to fit the scenario 
but does not stand well on its own when other explanations are equally convincing. 
4.        Institutional Theory - Status, Norms and Identity 
As described in Chapter I, the strength of the institutional argument is based 
heavily on the relative strength or weakness of the other hypotheses in illustrating the 
motivations for submarine development. Similar to the previous case studies, Japan's 
conventional submarine development is strongly influenced under the national security 
hypothesis. Therefore, in this section I lay out the main points on why institutional theory 
is difficult to use as a major influence in this case study. 
First, submarine development in Japan resurfaced in 1960. Japan had a previous 
submarine tradition on which to base its rebuilding program. In other words, Japan had 
submarines before submarines were "in." This period was primarily dominated elsewhere 
by the new deployments of the nuclear submarines. Conventional platforms were seen as 
diminishing in military value. Japan declined to make the jump to nuclear propulsion in 
order to join the "major" navies. There may have been varied reasons why Japan did not 
make this step in 1959, but since then Japan has developed the technology needed to 
complete the task and has declined to do so. Lastly, the rhetoric surrounding the JMSDF 
lacks any evidence of submarines being over-stressed. The doctrine and force planning of 
the JMSDF has created a well balanced fleet capable of carrying out multiple missions 
with a variety of platforms. Submarines are not the only platforms which can complete an 
ASW mission. No single platform type has been the center of the JMSDF. 
Japan's perception of its role in the world relies heavily upon a peaceful outward 
appearance. The importance of Article Nine to the Japanese tends to downplay the "value" 
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which a military platform could provide. As a means of reflecting identity, Japan focuses 
on economic success also limiting the ability of a submarine to reflect this. 
Institutional theory may provide some insight into the resistance to nuclear 
developments within Japan. Japan's view of itself as the sole victim of nuclear attack has 
given it a unique identity within the international culture. All nuclear advancements have 
met with resistance, but those which are able to portray peaceful uses have slowly been 
accepted. Initial plans for the Mutsu, a nuclear propelled surface vessel, were postponed 
because of perceptions. Due to the non-military links, this program was slowly accepted 
and became reality during the eighties. For a nation with this perception of of its identity, a 
nuclear submarine would tend to hold negative "value." 
C.       CONCLUSION 
The motivations for submarine development in Japan can be explained through 
national security issues with factional and technological influences as secondary factors. 
The Soviet submarine fleet, with upwards of 125 platforms, presented a clear and present 
danger to Japan and its maritime interests. This threat has lessened, but not disappeared. 
Submarine development was also influenced by factions including U.S. pressure. Opposing 
factions were able to limit the development through interpretation of the constitution and 
by imposing budgetary limits on defense expenditures. Economic capacity and 
technological capacity grew separately from the military, but led to opportunities for 
submarine improvements which may not have otherwise available. 
Without the presence of a significant security threat, the future of the JMSDF and 
its submarine fleet will depend upon the factional power struggle within the conservative 
wings. If the U.S.-Japan security alliance should breakdown, the JMSDF will be tasked to 
cover much larger obligations, now entrusted to the U.S. Navy. This situation would 
require the effective elimination of Article Nine along with the one percent of Gross 
Domestic Product limitation on defense budgets. The industrial base in Japan is capable of 
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accelerating production to compensate, but at a significant cost to the Japanese economy. 
One predicted force structure would be based around a U.S. model in order to fit shared 
technology. Primary forces would be centered on a surface fleet. Eventual leaps to nuclear 
propulsion and aircraft carriers would be the heaviest burdens to bear, but are well within 
the Japanese capability. 
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V.      RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Security relationships in the Asia-Pacific region are experiencing a period of 
uncertainty in terms of the future. By examining the motivations for submarine 
acquisitions, it is possible to make some predictions on this piece of the force structure 
puzzle. Japan and China provide a long term background of submarine development under 
very different circumstances. India stands closer as a model for the newer expanding 
navies, due to the late push for indigenous construction. 
The point of departure for this study is the increased emphasis on submarines in 
naval force structures throughout Asia. Of the nine navies that possess submarines, eight 
are currently modernizing their fleet. South Korea has joined this group in 1992. 
Singapore will be added when it receives the contracted hulls from Sweden, and Malaysia 
is training crews in preparation for acquisitions which are on hold. The acceleration in the 
overall trend will not likely continue well into the twenty-first century and may level off or 
merely appear as a statistical bulge. However, once these nations have committed to 
operating submarines, this undertaking will not be easily discarded. Even if this decade is 
just a "bulge," strategic planners could then predict the recurrence of this phenomenon 
when today's submarines come up for replacement in about twenty years. Although 
undersea warfare seemed to disappear with the cold war, the submarine's widespread 
acceptance as a naval component indicates greater likelihood of future undersea conflict. 
Additional submarines in the region lead to greater uncertainty as to the threat and hence, 
the greater need to control the undersea environment. 
A.        CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES 
The conventional submarine has become a widespread component of naval force 
structure. The most common vessels operated are the Russian Kilo and German 
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Type 209. These designs are available on the export market at reasonable cost and to any 
nation willing to negotiate with the builders. Type 209 design specifications have been 
included in the contracts for India and South Korea leading to construction programs in 
each of these nations. A license to build the Kilo is also expected to be sold, with the likely 
licensee being China, a 1995 buyer. The question at hand is why these submarines are 
being bought. 
The national security hypothesis is the prominent explanation for the conventional 
submarine program in each of the preceding case studies. Japan faced a direct submarine 
threat from the Soviet Union for three decades. The security relationship with the United 
States then helped to shape the response focusing Japan on conventional platforms. For 
India, the submarine was the most cost-effective platform to provide the needed strength 
to maintain superiority over Pakistan and meet the emerging challenge of China. 
Conventional submarines also met one of China's perceived security needs, but from a 
different angle, by providing an additional layer of defense against an aggressive 
superpower, while also creating a potential threat to China's neighbors. Security issues are 
present across the board, but the submarine is not used in the same manner to respond 
each threat. Japan focuses on the ASW aspect. India uses the submarine for defense of the 
Indian Ocean and China originally created an offensive capability to generate counter- 
threat. Therefore, even though national security appears to be overall driving factor in 
conventional submarine development, as the threat evolves, the submarine fleet should be 
expected to evolve in response. 
In each case study, other forces existed in shaping the submarine fleets. Most 
factional interests were generally in line with national needs, thus supporting the first 
hypothesis by not placing the faction's priority above the nation's. India's shipbuilding 
industry is one example. The program remained at a level commensurate with national 
needs vice expanding beyond them. In contrast, the conduct of opposing factions tends to 
limit a program. For example, China's political turmoil had nation-wide impact, yet the 
construction of the Romeo class submarine continued through the Great Leap Forward 
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and Cultural Revolution. Factions of Japan's population and political entities are pacifistic 
in nature, yet the JMSDF is continuously modernized to meet the evolving security needs 
of Japan. The limited efforts of these factional interests to curb submarine development 
can then be used to show how the security need overrode the factional interest. In general, 
factional interests are most influential during the formative years of submarine 
development. Once the program is well established, this factor diminishes. 
The technological momentum argument contributed little in explaining 
conventional acquisitions. In each case, the ship building capacity had to be expanded 
from a limited surface combatant infrastructure to accommodate submarines rather than 
emerging as a logical progression. Both India and China established nuclear propulsion 
programs prior to solidifying the construction infrastructure. Japan's submarines have 
weak ties to this hypothesis. Commercial technological improvements translated into 
submarine applications, but there is not a direct link create a need to design a new 
submarine. 
Institutional theory, by the methodology of this thesis, was difficult to apply to the 
conventional programs. Each conventional submarine fleet held strong motivations under 
the first two hypotheses, thus eliminating the choice of "institutional value" as the 
principal motivation. This does not say that conventional submarines cannot fit this mold. 
The submarine remains a low cost platform providing recognized power which for smaller 
navies can symbolize modernity. 
As an overall trend, national security based on perception of threat is the primary 
indicator for the acquisition and modernization of conventional submarines. I expect 
submarine acquisitions to continue into the next century and tail off as the Asian 
submarine fleets grow in size. If the security relationships throughout Asia can be 
stabilized to reduce regional tensions, then the trend may level out completely. If tensions 
grow, then the undersea environment will become increasingly important resulting in 
larger, more sophisticated fleets. In turn, the ASW technologies will be infinitely more 
valuable to all navies. 
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B.        NUCLEAR SUBMARINES 
The motivations for Indian and Chinese nuclear propulsion programs were not 
only different from each other, but were unique when compared to their conventional 
counterparts. Following the lease of the Soviet Charlie-I, India's naval nuclear desires 
became well known. The primary factor in evaluating India's program is the lack of a 
strategic vision beyond the Indian Ocean, particularly in the early years of development. 
India's main desire has always been to control its own destiny in the Indian Ocean. The 
conventional program addressed this need and has the capability to expand. The Indian 
nuclear propulsion program has developed at a high cost to the government and with 
limited strategic return to the military. Even today, the return on investment is only in 
terms of international attention. Parallel to the lack of security justification, the Bhaba 
Atomic Research Center (BARC) controlled the nuclear propulsion in a manner to further 
its own needs, even at a cost of setting back the program. The state's acceptance of 
BARC's control coupled with a low cost strategic alternative led to the evaluation of the 
institutional hypothesis. India places a high priority on its nuclear propulsion program. 
Indian naval rhetoric has centered on both the aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine until 
recently when the nuclear program has been promoted even at the cost of other strategic 
assets, including replacement carriers. The key point to evaluate is that India has 
continued to push for the large ticket item while the threats in the Indian Ocean have 
changed very little. 
China's nuclear submarine program was also shaped by factional and institutional 
motivations. As a possible third superpower, China may have been able to justify its 
nuclear programs based on security needs, but the PLAN lacked all complementing ASW 
forces. The undersea threat of the cold war cannot explain China's slow leap to the 
nuclear submarine club. Political factions within the PRC struggled over the organizational 
control of Project 09. This generally caused delays. After the Soviet Union refused to 
assist China with nuclear submarines, the PRC leadership developed an attitude that the 
process must be undertaken. Mao went as far as to say, "[China] will have to build nuclear 
80 
submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years!"119 (Luckily it did not take that long or the 
technology gap would have been huge.) Like India, China's lack of strategic doctrine to 
accompany the nuclear submarine's deployment points to the impact the submarine's value 
had on shaping the nuclear submarine program. 
Comparison of China and India indicates the strength of an institutional theory for 
Asia's nuclear programs as well as the influence created by factional interests. However, 
these cases nothing alike. Indian factions pushed the program to get it started, while 
Chinese political power plays delayed development. For China, the nuclear submarine 
represented a structural role of equality with the great powers. On the other hand, India 
valued the attention drawn from a nuclear submarine program. The limitations of this part 
of the study is that the conclusions may never be needed to explain future developments. 
Most navies of this area are highly unlikely to make this next step, with the notable 
exception of Japan. 
These case studies are unique due to their development inside a cold war 
environment. Japan is the state most capable of adding nuclear propulsion to its navy, but 
this will not occur until the international structure changes and the U.S.-Japan link is 
clearly broken. However, if Japan is to add nuclear propelled submarines to its fleet, the 
motivating factors will be very different from the Indian or Chinese case studies. First, the 
technological pieces are in place waiting to be assembled. Japan has already proven the 
capability to the international community with the voyages of Mutsu120 If Japan were to 
take this step, it likely would be in conjunction with a greater need to extend JMSDF 
forces around the globe in support of national interests vice as a symbol of modernity or 
national identity. 
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C.       IMPLICATIONS 
1. Asia-Pacific 
These case studies provide a window through which other Asian navies may be 
viewed in an attempt to understand the make-up of their navies. Of the eight remaining 
cases, three are just beginning submarine development and four are undertaking 
modernization. The endpoint of each navy's submarine development will impact the 
security relationships of the region. The importance of maritime interests will continue to 
grow with the region's expanding economies. The proliferation of submarines will create 
further uncertainty and increase the likelihood of submarines being perceived as a threat. 
The undersea environment will have to be considered in future bilateral and multilateral 
interactions. 
Applying the trends observed in this study to other submarine fleets will not 
necessarily provide perfect correlation. Most of the newer submarine fleets are beginning 
with smaller fleets and are not including an indigenous building program to allow for 
continuous modernization. The motivations for acquiring two to four conventional 
submarines may be different than the reasons behind building a larger fleet. At this level of 
acquisition, the conventional submarine may take on some of the social values associated 
with nuclear submarines, as seen in the China or India case studies. This question is 
outside the scope of this thesis, but would provide an interesting base for further study. 
2. United States 
For the United States, the trend is as important as the motivations. More important 
though is whether the trend will continue. As stated above, based on national security 
motivations, I believe the trend will continue into the next decade and conventional 
submarines will be the common factor between Asian navies. These navies will deploy 
conventional submarines carrying modern weapons systems, primarily in the littoral 
regions of Asia. The United States, Russia, China and eventually India will have the lock 
on nuclear submarines in the Pacific. I expect the Indian Navy and PLAN will continue to 
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focus on each other as a means to justify the cost of nuclear propulsion as it would be 
difficult to step away from these programs. While attention focuses on the larger navies, 
AIP equipped submarines will make a debut in the Pacific and will be a challenging piece 
of the ASW puzzle. 
How does this impact the U.S. Navy? The undersea threat is far from gone. This 
study focused on platform acquisition via purchase or indigenous construction. Equal 
attention should be paid to the conventional weapons markets which will arm these 
submarines with modern torpedoes and mines. The United States would have a difficult 
time in attempting to control the transfer of submarines and submarine weapons systems. 
Considerations were made over banning submarines after the First World War due to the 
style of attack, the process failed. With forty-four navies operating submarines today, this 
is obviously out of the question. The arms market is diversified from the Russian Kilo 
class submarine to the British Tigerfish torpedo and French DUUX-5 sonar suite. 
Diplomatic pressure may provide some influence on the process, but pressure at one point 
may only force a buyer to a different market. Efforts in this area can provide only limited 
returns. 
If submarine and submarine weapons proliferation cannot be controlled, then U.S. 
forces must be ready to counter the undersea threat. ASW operations in the environment 
around Asia will provide new challenges to all segments of the ASW picture. In order to 
provide protection to U.S. forces operating in the region, today's ASW efforts will need 
to be prepared for the smaller conventional threat in the littoral areas. The burden is 
placed on the navy attempting to conduct anti-submarine warfare. ASW forces need to be 
significantly larger than undersea aggressors, in order to counter even a small submarine 
fleet. The Falklands War was a glaring example of this fact. 
Familiarity with the littoral operating environment will be key to the success of 
ASW forces. The only means to gain this experience is through actual operations. Both 
Japan and South Korea, our strongest Asian allies, are operating modern conventional 
submarines. Joint exercises between U.S. ASW forces and Asian submarines can provide 
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invaluable operating time for all crews involved. These exercises can be conducted in 
difficult ASW environments including shallow regions. Crew experience in these situations 
cannot be replaced by simulators or team trainers. 
In 1990, Admiral James Fitzgerald and John Benedict pointed out other applicable 
ASW needs. These included torpedo defenses, non-acoustic and shallow-water ASW 
technologies. They also proposed the need for increased surveillance and intelligence to 
track small navies' submarines. Knowing where to begin a search significantly increases 
the odds of locating a quiet submarine.121 The Pacific Rim is evolving into an area with a 
high concentration of conventional submarines. These ASW initiatives become imperative 
if U.S. interests are threatened. 
Conventional submarines have become a valuable asset in Asian naval force 
structure. The current trend of acquisitions is unlikely to turn downward. As long as the 
security needs of the region's members are threatened, submarines can be expected to be a 
part of the response. For the United States, the return of an adversary such as the Soviet 
Union is improbable, but the much less predictable threats are here to stay. 
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